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UGO MATTEI*
The Cold War and Comparative Law: A Reflection on 
the Politics of Intellectual Discipline†
How much does the current state of comparative legal studies owe 
to Cold War political imperatives? What happened to our discipline 
once such imperatives declined in the aftermath of the bipolar world? 
Comparative lawyers have been completely naive about the impact of 
the Cold War on their own discipline both as it reached maturity in the 
1950s and as it developed after the fall of the Berlin Wall until now. 
This consequence of the professional depoliticization of comparative 
law is especially troublesome since the Cold War has accompanied in 
its entirety the historical moment in which the common law tradition, 
especially in its U.S. epiphany, has been able to conquer global legal 
hegemony. Thus, the current disciplinary knowledge of comparative 
law, the very toolkit of our methodology, has developed in the context of 
the Cold War confrontation and has reached full global dominance in 
its aftermath. It is worth thinking about possible implications of this 
context on the professional project of legal comparativism if we wish to 
maintain an acceptable level of critical understanding of ourselves.
I. Background
An impressive debate has unfolded in many social sciences to 
assess the impact of Cold War mentality on the epistemology of the 
different disciplines.1 Scholars have agreed upon the necessity of 
reading the Cold War as something more than a discrete and rela-
tively short historical period of confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. From a rich debate, it has emerged 
quite clearly that it is much more productive to see the Cold War as 
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Law, U.C. Hastings. Professor of Civil Law, Università di Torino. Fellow of Collegio 
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1. See unIversItIes and empIre: money and polItIcs In the socIal scIences durIng 
the cold War (Christopher Simpson ed., 1998) [hereinafter unIversItIes and empIre]; 
the cold War and the unIversIty: toWard an Intellectual hIstory of the postWar years 
(Andre Shiffrin ed., 1997); sonja m. amadae, ratIonalIzIng capItalIst democracy: the 
cold War orIgIns of ratIonal choIce lIBeralIsm (2003). See also Hunter Heyck & David 
Kaiser, Focus: New Perspectives on Science and the Cold War, 101 IsIs 362 (2010).
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a broader regime of knowledge production rather than as a historical 
time.2
Academic lawyers have been completely absent from such a 
debate, and so important critical insights into their own role as pro-
ducers of knowledge have been lost. This Article tries to fill this gap 
with respect to comparative legal studies. My research question 
is—How much does the current state of comparative legal studies 
owe to Cold War political imperatives? What happened to our disci-
pline once such imperatives declined in the aftermath of the bipolar 
world? The question is important because the debate on the Cold 
War in social sciences has shown that after a quarter century since 
its official end, the regime of knowledge production determined by 
the Cold War still governs us from the grave, as Maitland used to say 
of the forms of action at common law.3
In this Article, I use the term “Cold War” in its broad meaning, in 
an attempt to understand transformations in the discipline of com-
parative law as the outcome of the confrontation between capitalism 
and its alternatives.4 Comparative lawyers have been completely 
naive about the impact of the Cold War on their own discipline both 
as it reached maturity in the 1950s and as it developed after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall until now.5 This consequence of the professional 
depoliticization of comparative law is especially troublesome, since 
the Cold War has accompanied in its entirety the historical moment 
in which the common law tradition, especially in its U.S. epiphany, 
has been able to conquer global legal hegemony.6 Thus, the current 
disciplinary knowledge of comparative law, the very toolkit of our 
methodology, has developed in the context of the Cold War confron-
tation and has reached full global dominance in its aftermath. It is 
worth thinking about possible implications of this context for the 
professional project of legal comparativism7 if we wish to maintain 
an acceptable level of critical self-understanding.
The American century in law started by contrasting itself with 
the poor performance of the continental civil law in facing the rise 
of the fascist state in Italy, Germany, and Japan (not to mention 
2. See Bruce Cumings, Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International 
Studies During and After the Cold War, in unIversItIes and empIre, supra note 1, at 
159.
3. See frederIc W. maItland, the forms of actIon at common laW: a course of 
lectures (Alfred Henry Chaytor & William Joseph Whittaker eds., 1936).
4. In a sense, this Article could be a chapter in john QuIgley, sovIet legal 
InnovatIon and the laW of the Western World (2012).
5. A very recent interesting development has occurred in the Italian academic 
scene where two leading comparatists, independently from each other, have pub-
lished books on the geopolitics of comparative law. See mauro BussanI, Il dIrItto 
dell’ occIdente: geopolItIcal delle regole gloBalI (2010); pIergIuseppe monaterI, 
geopolItIca del dIrItto: genesI, governo e dIssoluzIone deI corpI polItIcI (2013).
6. See Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western 
Law, 42 am. j. comp. L. 195 (1994).
7. See magalI sarfattI larson, the rIse of professIonalIsm (1977).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/65/3/567/4563343
by UC Hastings Law Library user
on 23 February 2018
569THE COLD WAR AND COMPARATIVE LAW2017]
Vichy France). It went on to differentiate itself from the law in the 
Soviet Union and more broadly in the socialist world until the offi-
cial end of the Cold War. The American century has reached the pres-
ent times in which the constructed “evil” appears to be the Islamic 
legal tradition diffused through “rogue states” or “failed states,”8 and 
other global competitors, such as China, consistently deemed to lack 
the rule of law.9 It is very unlikely that this attitude, almost unani-
mous among lawyers, would leave the comparative law community 
untouched, in spite of its self-image as the only worldly approach to 
legal studies in the United States.10 In the United States, the domi-
nant legal culture from the early twentieth century has reduced 
legal cosmopolitanism into the Wilsonian missionary spirit of teach-
ing others the right way of doing things rather than engaging with 
unbiased understanding of legal “otherness.”11 Even if lawyers are 
historically marginalized in American campus life, and comparat-
ists the marginalized among lawyers, their struggle to claim a seat 
among “social scientists” has been itself a product of the Cold War 
spirit. Even before rational choice theory, the brainchild of the Rand 
Corporation, took over the American legal discourse by means of the 
“law and economics”12 movement, the realist triumph in the inter-
war years is difficult to understand outside of the confrontation with 
communist Russia and its attack on the bourgeois rule of law. The 
Cold War moreover triggered the creation of the International and 
Area Studies programs especially at Columbia, Harvard, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), with a massive injec-
tion of military money,13 either directly or through like-minded inter-
mediary foundations and corporations.14
Within a new strategy to deploy a politically disciplined inter-
disciplinary work needed for useful intelligence of the world, the 
few academic lawyers who were engaged in international and com-
parative work were natural candidates to participate in such inter-
disciplinary research projects. Cold War money promoted the 
development of new alliances in social sciences to “progress” from 
the classic, early twentieth-century division into economics, sociology, 
political science, and history, whose success in depoliticizing social 
8. See Pinar Bilgin & Adam David Morton, Historicizing Representations of 
“Failed States”: Beyond the Cold War Annexation of the Social Sciences?, 23 thIrd 
World Q. 55 (2002).
9. See ugo matteI & laura nader, plunder: When the rule of laW Is Illegal 
67ff. (2008).
10. See Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative 
Law, 26 harv. Int’l l.j. 411, 416 (1985).
11. See jedIdIah kroncke, the futIlIty of laW afnd development: chIna and the 
dangers of exportIng amerIcan laW (2015).
12. See amadae, supra note 1. See also David C. Engerman, Social Science in the 
Cold War, 101 IsIs 393 (2010).
13. See stuart W. leslIe, the cold War and amerIcan scIence: the mIlItary-
IndustrIal academIc complex at mIt and stanford (1993).
14. See Cumings, supra note 2.
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theory and shielding it from deep critique was an acquis.15 Thus, in 
the early 1950s, many professional academic associations were cre-
ated in the United States in an unprecedented effort of profession-
alization of disciplinary knowledge to create enduring professional 
hierarchies.16 The birth of the American Society of Comparative 
Law (ASCL) dates to 1951. Since its creation, the ASCL has become 
the dominant national group at the International Academy of 
Comparative Law founded by the international organization of 
comparatists in 192417 at least in part as a response to Soviet legal 
innovation.
The scant attention paid by the comparative legal community to 
its own historical contextualization might seem at first to be at odds 
with a number of its established methodological claims, such as the 
claim that “comparison involves history” or its self-image as either 
directly a social science or at least as indispensable to any serious 
effort to approach law as a social science. However, someone becom-
ing acquainted with the literature on the impact of the Cold War on 
social sciences will see no contradiction. The lack of attention on the 
part of comparative lawyers to the impact of the Cold War (and its 
money) on the methodology and claims of their discipline is a direct 
consequence of the broader phenomenon of “depoliticization” of the 
legal discourse.18 This phenomenon, captured by the dominant meta-
phor of the lawyer as a “social engineer” inaugurated in the age of 
legal realism in the aftermath of World War I, attained global domi-
nance by the fall of the Berlin Wall.19 Comparative law in the early 
phase of the Cold War eagerly participated in the project, which it 
believed to be a methodological progress, but which in fact was just 
a response to research agendas defined in higher political places 
to establish what has become the dominant regime of knowledge. 
Particularly successful in the containment of the political critique in 
the discipline of comparative law has been the construction of his-
tory as a science in its own terms, so that other branches of social 
sciences not only divided human activity into naturalized non-com-
municating domains (the political, the economic, and the social) but 
focused on the present. Consequently, the history used (when at all) 
15. The classic discussion remains roBerto unger, knoWledge and polItIcs 
(1976).
16. See Cumings, supra note 2. See also Daniel Vukovich, Postcolonialism, 
Globalization, and the “Asia Question,” in the oxford handBook of postcolonIal 
studIes 587, 589 (Graham Huggan ed., 2013).
17. See David S. Clark, Development of Comparative Law in the United States, 
in the oxford handBook of comparatIve laW 176 (Mathais Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
18. See mark kelman, a guIde to crItIcal legal studIes (1987). See also Duncan 
Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in the camBrIdge companIon to 
comparatIve laW 35 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012).
19. See Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge 
Guido Calabresi, 64 md. l. rev. 220 (2005).
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in the social sciences is itself disciplined and incapable of producing 
a political critique of the present.
Comparative law did not escape this fate.20 The historical 
approach deployed is itself disciplined within an idea of legal his-
tory, a formalistic separation of the past from the present that makes 
it very hard to learn from earlier mistakes. The lack of a histori-
cal understanding of one’s own roots easily leads to an imaginary 
self-image, with the almost unavoidable consequence of developing 
hubris, or what one scholar has brilliantly described as a disciplinary 
Cinderella complex.21
In the present Article, I will deal with the history of comparative 
law in a very different way. To begin with, I shall not disentangle it 
from academic law in general and will see its historical unfolding not 
as an autonomous discipline22 but as a part (quite small indeed) of 
a broader phenomenon of knowledge production in which the West 
incrementally shifted away from any comparative project and actu-
ally developed sophisticated techniques of self-congratulation. In so 
doing, I consider the various attempts at making comparative law 
something like a neutral science, as a historically situated ideological 
contribution in the production of disciplined knowledge, and I try to 
approach the comparative study of law within the pattern of global 
legal hegemony where it is the American version of comparative law 
that matters the most globally.23 This is not a paper about how to 
compare the law. It is rather a reflection on the political, historical, 
and social circumstances that make us compare the way we do.
Because the Cold War was about capitalism versus socialism, the 
historical period that I consider extends beyond the actual Cold War 
as a time period of roughly forty years from the immediate aftermath 
of the Allied victory against Nazi Germany.24 In my understanding, 
the Cold War started immediately after the October Revolution in 
1917 conquered American public opinion during the Red Scares of 
the 1920s, and never relented as a clash between two incompatible 
visions of human organization, in spite of the common effort against 
Nazi Germany. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima in this perspective 
is much easier to explain as a Cold War attempt to contain the USSR 
in Asia rather than as a final strike against what was left of the Axis 
Alliance (Germany–Japan).25
20. See James Gordley, Comparative Law and Legal History, in the oxford 
handBook of comparatIve laW, supra note 17, at 754.
21. Frankenberg, supra note 10.
22. See Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous 
Discipline, 11 tul. eur. & cIv. L.F. 49 (1996).
23. See Ugo Mattei, Some Realism About Comparativism: Comparative Law 
Teaching in the Hegemonic Jurisdiction, 50 am. j. comp. l. 87 (Supp. 2002).
24. For essential historical background, see lynn etherIdge davIs, the cold War 
BegIns: sovIet–amerIcan conflIct over east europe (1974).
25. See jacQues r. paWels, the myth of the good War: amerIca In the second 
World War (2002).
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I will thus consider the dialectic between Western and socialist 
law as it affected comparative law throughout most of the twentieth 
century.
One more point of clarification: in this Article, I am interested 
in comparative law as a collective enterprise of a loosely organized 
academic community. I am not interested in tracing the most original 
ideas or the earliest individual scholar who contributed such ideas 
to the community. Comparative law in my understanding is itself a 
“derivative” scholarly discipline, and many of the ideas and tools that 
we develop in our line of business find their genealogy elsewhere. 
So, for example, much of the work on functionalism-structuralism 
pioneered in the 1920s and 1930s by the German scholar Ernst 
Rabel—work which he applied to comparative law in the 1950s and 
1960s when he immigrated to the United States—was itself proba-
bly derivative of the work by Bronisław Malinowski and other social 
anthropologists.26 To me what matters for the purposes of this Article 
is that Rabel’s work became mainstream in comparative law during 
the Cold War. Zweigert and Koetz applied it in their introduction to 
comparative law (in the first edition in 1969),27 Schlesinger deployed 
it at the Cornell seminars (1960–1966), and Sacco, through Gorla, 
stretched it to a sort of general theory (entirely limited to private 
law) that has dominated Italian academia.28
I find it difficult to believe the dominant narrative, which turns 
the private law bias of our modern discipline into a historical tradi-
tion dating back to Roman law. I claim that this bias, around which 
comparatists have developed the very notion of the Western legal 
tradition as well as most of the dominant taxonomies, finds a bet-
ter explanation as an effort to defend capitalist law against the thick 
intellectual critique of Eugeny Pashukanis who, in 1924, unveiled 
the class nature of legal universalism.29
I also consider relevant the professional organization of the dis-
cipline and its timing. Quite significantly, the International Academy 
of Comparative Law was founded in 1924, in the midst of legal 
innovations promoted by Lenin through the New Economic Policy 
(NEP).30 The Faculté Internationale de Droit Comparé (FIDC) was 
26. See Laura Nader, Who’s Comparative Law? A Global Perspective, in 
comparatIve laW and anthropology (James Nafziger ed., 2017).
27. Indeed Konrad Zweigert, Methodologie du droit comparé, in melanges offerts 
à jacQues maury 579 (1960) had already fully developed the methodological function-
alist groundwork of the introduction.
28. See Elisabetta Grande, Development of Comparative Law in Italy, in 
the oxford handBook of comparatIve laW 107 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2010). See the methodological discussion in Rodolfo Sacco, Legal 
Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 am. j. comp. l. 1 (1991) 
(referring to gIno gorla, Il contratto (1955)).
29. See evgeny pashukanIs, the general theory of laW and marxIsm (1924).
30. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 
another early organization where comparatists were active, was established in 1926 
as an organ of the League of Nations, an organization joined by the Soviet Union in 
1934 only to be expelled (illegally) in 1939.
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established in 1961 in an organizational effort that has instituted 
the dominant taxonomies much more solidly than their theoretical 
robustness, as we will see. I borrow from John Quigley the mirror 
image explanation of Soviet legal innovation as a trigger of Western 
legal change.31
In sum, contrary to the dominant tradition, I place the begin-
ning of a scientific claim of comparative law at a time when the very 
notion of universal science was being disputed at the Soviet Academy 
of Science. In the heat of the confrontation between capitalism and 
its adversary, nothing remained shielded from the total critique and 
triggered a call to arms in the restructuring of the, until then undis-
puted, scientific knowledge.32 Comparative lawyers, more or less con-
sciously have framed their own niche of disciplined learning in reply 
to that call.
II. the dIscIplIned narratIve
The accepted disciplinary wisdom of comparatists is that com-
parative law came of age as an autonomous discipline in the 1950s 
out of an internal scientific evolution. The dominant narrative is 
that, before the mid-twentieth century, and before (and after) its 
conventional date of birth (the 1900 Paris Congress of the Société de 
Législation Comparée), comparative law was an amateurish prac-
tice of a limited number of erudite scholars whose methodological 
approach was quite primitive.33
Lawyers engaging in the study of foreign law from the second 
half of the nineteenth to the early twentieth century would take 
the law of the different countries, so to speak, at face value.34 They 
would learn something about a foreign legal system by reading books 
written by local scholars. In the absence of any critical method, the 
self-perception of such domestic scholars became the accepted canon. 
The birth of the most enduring stereotypes of comparative law dates 
back to this early phase of “contrastive” comparative law when a 
few European scholars were interested in comparative legislation in 
31. See QuIgley, supra note 4. The foundation of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) is an especially interesting reaction of capitalist powers to the 
early socialist labor emancipation through law.
32. See Slava Gerovitch, Writing History in the Present Tense: Cold War-Era 
Discursive Strategies of Soviet Historians of Science and Technology, in unIversItIes 
and empIre, supra note 1, at 189, 192 (citing Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic 
Roots of Newton’s “Principia,” in scIence at the crossroads 182 (Nicholai Bukharin 
et al. eds., 1971) (1931)).
33. See Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the 
International Age, 75 tul. l. rev. 1103 (2000–2001). See also rethInkIng the masters 
of comparatIve laW (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
34. On Wigmore’s naiveté, see Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: 
Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 harv. Int’l L.J. 221 (1999).
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order to overcome the formidable intellectual and linguistic barriers 
that European statehood had produced among the legal systems.35
From the second half of the nineteenth century, anyone wishing 
to familiarize themselves with a matter of French law would most 
likely be struck by the emphasis it places on the Civil Code, and 
more generally on statutes, as the dominant, almost unique source 
of law that had survived the French Revolution. Despite François 
Geny, the common wisdom among French lawyers was that “case 
law” was all but a swear word in French jurisprudence. During the 
same period, a student of the sources of English law would find him-
self at the very zenith of the doctrine of stare decisis. The Judicature 
Acts (1873) had just created the hierarchical structure necessary for 
stare decisis to become meaningful. Indeed, the practice of follow-
ing precedents, both horizontally and vertically, transformed itself 
into a strict legal duty from the beginning of the twentieth century 
to the Practice Statement of 1966.36 At Oxbridge, Maitland, Pollock, 
and other Victorian academic lawyers and legal historians would 
exaggerate the insularity and uniqueness of English law, and their 
vision would become the canon among the early comparatists. In 
the same period, someone inclined to study German law would find 
a relentless self-congratulatory rhetoric of then globally dominant 
German academic lawyers, whose masterpiece, the general part of 
the German Civil Code was still to come.37
This was the scenario that the early Italian comparative lawyer 
and politician Emerico Amari would find when writing his (naive) 
1859 book on comparative legislation. Taking the municipal profes-
sional descriptions at face value, comparatists would conclude that 
the civil law is a tradition of codified law, with no role for case law 
(France) and a large influence of professors (Germany). They con-
trasted it sharply with the casuistry of the common law, a tradition 
where case law is the dominant source of law because of the principle 
of stare decisis that made it binding.38
The conventional wisdom of our discipline signaled an abrupt 
change in the two central decades of the last century, witnessed 
among other things by the publication of a few classics, very differ-
ent among each other, but sharing a new “professional” quality. Rudolf 
B. Schlesinger in the United States (1950),39 René David in France 
(1950),40 Frederick Henry Lawson in England (1953),41 Gino Gorla 
35. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 am. 
j. comp. l. 477 (1995).
36. See john h. Baker, an IntroductIon Into englIsh legal hIstory (2005).
37. john p. daWson, the oracles of the laW (1968).
38. See leontIn-jean constantInesco, traIté de droIt comparé (1972).
39. rudolf B. schlesInger, comparatIve laW: cases, texts, materIals (1950).
40. René DavId, Les grands systèmes de droIt contemporaIns (R. David John & 
E.C. Brierley trans., 1985) (1964).
41. f.h. laWson, a common laWyer looks at the cIvIl laW (1953).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/65/3/567/4563343
by UC Hastings Law Library user
on 23 February 2018
575THE COLD WAR AND COMPARATIVE LAW2017]
in Italy (1955),42 and Konrad Zweigert and Hein Koetz in Germany 
(1969)43 are widely accredited as being the movers and shakers of this 
change. These great masters were uniquely equipped to go beyond the 
faithful belief of what domestic lawyers of a different country would 
say about their own legal systems. These intellectual giants were pro-
fessionally capable of verifying the truth of a foreign statement about 
the law, either because, like Schlesinger, they were fully trained in one 
civil law and one common law jurisdiction;44 or because, like Gorla and 
David, they spent a significant amount of time studying and teaching 
in remote contexts (Egypt and Ethiopia, respectively); or because of a 
unique degree of familiarity with Roman law (such as Lawson in 1953, 
and Alan Watson in 1974), they were equipped, as nobody before them, 
to check the ideological self-perception of municipal lawyers.45 Thus, 
for reasons that are, so to speak, internal to the profession, compara-
tive law was able to go beyond the mere juxtaposition of black letter 
law. The quality and culture of the legal professionals engaging with 
it explains how the discipline reached a much more advanced stage of 
intellectual development.46
In a broader but still legal context, outside of the narrow disci-
pline of comparative law, the professional explanation of the “com-
ing of age” of comparative law seems even more solid. Legal realism 
was now dominant in the United States,47 and the United States was 
globally hegemonic.48 Black letter analysis, discredited in the United 
States, became an object of increasing critique in Europe among the 
most advanced schools of thought.49 Since World War I, it had become 
increasingly clear that the traditional conceptualistic approach of 
legal formalism led to absurd results even in a core area of private 
law, such as property and contract, shaken as they were by the war 
effort.50 Legal scholars were following domestic legal changes to 
42. gIno gorla, Il contratto (1954).
43. k. zWeIgert & h. koetz, an IntroductIon of comparatIve laW (Tony Weir 
trans., 2d ed. 1988).
44. See rudolf B. schlesInger, memorIes (Ugo Mattei & Andrea Pradi eds., 2000).
45. The dominant scientific narrative in comparative law has been somewhat 
formalized by Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative 
Law, 39 am. j. comp. L. 1 (1991). For a discussion, see Ugo Mattei, The Comparative 
Jurisprudence of Schlesinger and Sacco: A Study in Legal Influence, in rethInkIng 
the masters of comparatIve laW, supra note 33, at 238.
46. For additional information and some materials for a history of the discipline, 
see rethInkIng the masters of comparatIve laW, supra note 33.
47. See gary mInda, postmodern legal movements: laW and jurIsprudence at 
century’s end (1995).
48. See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the 
Latin Resistance, 10 Ind. j. gloBal legal stud. 383 (2003).
49. See karl renner, the InstItutIons of prIvate laW and theIr socIal functIons 
(1949); leon duguIt, laW In the modern state (1919); ludWIg raIser, dIe aufgaBe des 
prIvatrechts (1977). See generally Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a 
Tree?, 66 vand. l. rev. 869 (2014).
50. Especially in property law, the idea of the voluntary and despotic dominium 
could not survive the reality of an increasingly interventionist state. In the United 
States, Hohfeld was looking into the variety of relationships to exit from the conun-
drum. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 yale L.J. 16 (1913).
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attune their analytical tools to reality. Legal realism attracted non-
lawyers to U.S. law schools that were helping in a scholarly effort to 
make law accepted among the social sciences.51 The different “mirror 
images” of law as reflective of the social reality would serve the pur-
pose of making lawyers accepted among social scientists and social 
engineers.52
Thus, there is more to the narrow explanation of the coming to 
age of comparative law as an autonomous methodological improve-
ment in the discipline due to the exceptional quality of some of its 
professional leaders. A broader, still professional, explanation has to 
do with the change in the intellectual leadership in Western law that 
took place in the immediate aftermath of World War II.53 To be sure, 
American hegemony in jurisprudence contributed to comparative law 
in a significant way through a healthy injection of legal realism. It is 
sufficient to think about Dean Roscoe Pound, whose work ridiculed 
the so-called “mechanical jurisprudence” of the French Jacobean 
rhetoric;54 or Karl Llewellyn, whose work on case law in Germany, 
only recently published in English, shows an unprecedented degree 
of awareness and comparative sophistication.55 In short, American 
legal culture contributed to the fundamental distinction between 
law in the books and law in action, and the consequent functionalist 
shift, which is the closest thing we have to “a canon” in contemporary 
comparative law.56 This broader professional explanation contributes 
to the idea (criticized only very recently) that comparative law, like 
other social sciences, is a nonpolitical, neutral exercise.
III. a Broader approach
In this Article, I look for a different explanation of the coming to 
age of comparative law and its current paradoxical decline.57 Despite 
my skepticism about the narratives of improvement, I do not wish 
to dismiss the conventional wisdom. There is some truth in assum-
ing an incremental process of sociological transformation of a rela-
tively new academic discipline that, practiced more professionally, 
displays a methodological “improvement” from the lack of awareness 
51. See grant gIlmore, the ages of amerIcan laW (1977).
52. See Wolfgang frIedman, the changIng structure of InternatIonal laW (1964); 
the “mirror image” explanation of legal change by Friedman triggered the critique of 
alan Watson, socIety and legal change (1977).
53. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in the neW laW and economIc development 19, 25–71 (David M. Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Mattei, supra note 6.
54. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 colum. l. rev. 605 (1908).
55. karl n. lleWellyn, the case laW system In amerIca (Michael Ansaldi trans., 
Univ. Chicago Press 1989).
56. See Reimann, supra note 33.
57. Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not to Be Missed: The Future of Comparative 
Law in The United States, 46 am. j. comp. L. 709 (1998).
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of the early législation comparée to the intellectual sophistication of 
the functionalist methodology as deployed by Schlesinger. The con-
ventional narrative is internal to the discipline, and—while perhaps 
ungenerously dismissive of the quite impressive degree of method-
ological awareness of some of its early students (like Montesquieu 
if compared to his contemporaries)58—it is certainly helpful. Even 
expanding it to include in the picture American legal hegemony, and 
the hegemony of legal realism within it, we are still within a profes-
sionalized explanation which assumes the progress of science to be 
ultimately independent from political needs.
I wish, however, to supplement this vision with an external 
explanation of both the content and timing of the coming of age of 
comparative law. My explanation calls attention to the impact of the 
Soviet Revolution and the Cold War on the Western legal community. 
I submit that the radicalism of the Soviet critique to the bourgeois 
legality has not only led to much innovation in the substantive laws 
of Western countries, but also impacted comparative law. The young 
discipline received strong incentives to develop new, less formalistic 
methodologies in order to participate in the overall political project 
of reacting to the intellectually powerful communist challenge to 
Western legality. At least since the Wilsonian period, the approach 
of the U.S. legal community, and more broadly of American public 
discourse, began its notorious missionary spirit to export the rule of 
law. Earlier moments of genuine interest in the law of other people, 
still very vibrant in, say, Benjamin Franklin, were discontinued as 
the comparative project incrementally transformed itself in an effort 
to teach the “others” the superiority of American law.59 The political 
climate of the Cold War exacerbated this tendency, but at the same 
time accrued the effort to know one’s enemy (and one’s friends).60
Here the political explanation must be qualified. On the one 
hand, one could argue that, as a social discipline, comparative 
law changed so as to reflect the different social and legal condi-
tions, such as the birth of the Soviet Union in 1922 or that of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, which it has autonomously iden-
tified as relevant. This explanation would still consider the setting 
of the research agenda to be within the province of the scholars. 
Better scholars are going to pose more interesting research ques-
tions.61 My suggestion is of a different nature.62 I suggest that com-
paratists have been part of an agenda set elsewhere in political and 
58. See, e.g., peter steIn, legal evolutIon: the story of an Idea (2009).
59. See the excellent study in Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-
Comparative Law, 45 vand. j. transnat’l L. 477 (2012).
60. See unIversItIes and empIre, supra note 1.
61. See karl popper, the logIc of scIentIfIc dIscovery (1934).
62. See teemu ruskola, legal orIentalIsm: chIna, the unIted states, and modern 
laW (2013). See also popper, supra note 61. On the Cambridge Companion to 
Comparative Law, see Kroncke, supra note 11.
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economic networks (e.g., philanthropist foundations, the Department 
of Defense, the Office of Strategic Services) participating in the 
effort of containing the spread of socialism, which at the time was 
both a politically and a jurisprudentially credible alternative to capi-
talism.63 Thus, I use the idea of a “Cold War” attitude in the profes-
sion without any meaning whatsoever of a shared political agenda 
among professional comparatists. Konrad Zweigert, for instance, 
was actively involved in politics in the early 1960s with the Social 
Democratic Party, which at the time was still officially Marxist. 
Nevertheless, professional comparatists could not remain immune 
to the setting of an internationalist agenda of containment, when 
such an agenda came endowed with tremendous money and politi-
cal-academic support. Ford Foundation money, for example, enabled 
projects in “law and development” in which American masters of 
comparative law, such as John Merryman, were among the “law and 
development” leaders.64 The Ford Foundation also funded, even more 
important in this context, the Cornell Project on the “common core 
of legal systems” that brought to Cornell an entire generation of 
world comparatists (including Gino Gorla) to study with Schlesinger. 
Legal Sovietology could not have even existed if the travels and orga-
nizational efforts of John Hazard and Harold Berman had not been 
lavishly funded by Rockefeller Foundation money at the Russian 
institutes at Columbia and Harvard. The Carnegie Corporation, 
too, was active in this enterprise and has routinely funded for many 
years the Cornell Common Core Project.65 Scholarly enterprises 
needed political support, and the line separating academic scholar-
ship from intelligence was very thin (when existing at all) during the 
Cold War confrontation.66
The Cold War indeed explains the bipartisan political climate 
diffused in the United States after the “red scares” of the 1920s 
well beyond the excesses of McCarthyism of the 1950s. The con-
struction of critique as “un-American” and of opposition as dis-
loyalty does not require the excesses of the Senate Committee 
or of the recurrent Stalinist purges to affect scholarship. Self-
censorship, for fear, opportunism, or even just lack of critical 
63. China was not a credible legal alternative. It is no surprise that comparatists 
devoted very scant attention to this experience until it became itself a credible threat 
after 1978. China remained relegated in the pariah status of the “other” conceptions.
64. John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, 
Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 am. j. comp. L. 
457 (1997). On the origins and might of the Ford Foundation, see Francis X. Sutton, 
The Ford Foundation: The Early Years, 116 daedalus 41 (1987).
65. Schlesinger acknowledged this funding in 1 formatIon of contracts: a study 
of the common core of legal systems (Rudolf B. Schlesinger ed., 1968) [hereinafter 
formatIon of contracts].
66. See sIgmund dIamond, compromIsed campus: the collaBoratIon of unIversItIes 
WIth the IntellIgence communIty, 1945–1955 (1992).
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spirit, is a widely diffused attitude in academia, yesterday as 
today, on this side or the other of the walls. The Cold War phan-
tom67 has triggered a massive investment in the so-called annex-
ation of social sciences and in the creation of international and 
area studies programs in the United States. My claim is that com-
parative law came of age the way it did, not only “within” the ideo-
logical effort of containment, but more precisely “because of ” this 
capitalist effort to protect itself.
With the torch of the Western legal hegemony in the United 
States, Germany traumatized by the partition (though the construc-
tion of the Berlin Wall began only in 1961), and the success of the 
Maoist revolution in China, comparative law scholars were finding 
it hard to share their capitalist colleagues’ old positivistic vision 
of the law. Neither legal realism, nor the legal process—it is worth 
stating clearly—abandoned the positivistic stance. In the dominant 
domestic approach, law was still the product of state sovereignty; 
to the community of those engaged in comparative study, such a 
reductionist vision was an obstacle to developing meaningful gen-
eral taxonomies aimed at managing the increasing complexity of 
a worldwide legal scenario. Comparative lawyers stimulated by a 
shared research agenda with social scientists, were at the same time 
busy looking into a strategy aimed at delegitimizing the commu-
nist legal order despite its positivistic legitimacy, and looking into 
non-positivistic factors of unity rather than of division within the 
capitalist block.
To do so, they deployed a double-standard strategy. On the one 
hand, it was necessary to both maintain and qualify the traditional 
distinction between the common law and civil law. This was still 
the main subject matter of the relatively new discipline grounded 
in the earlier “contrastive” approach of the législation comparée.68 
On the other hand, this classic opposition could not be grounded in 
political options, which nevertheless were the unifying element of 
the “socialist law family.” Thus a quite remarkable degree of ambi-
guity as to the choice between “contrastive” rather than “integra-
tive” methods. The early work on the “Western concept of law,” 
which generated Geoffrey Sawers’s long essay in the International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law69 (excerpts of which made it 
67. See Laura Nader, The Phantom Factor: Impact of the Cold War on 
Anthropology, in the cold War and the unIversIty 107 (Noam Chomsky et al. eds., 
1997). I use in this Article the idea of “phantom” as the construction of a Cold War 
mentalité by the ideological apparatuses (in the sense of Althusser) of the different 
states involved.
68. See Schlesinger, supra note 35.
69. See Geoffrey Sawer, The Western Conception of Law, in 2 InternatIonal 
encyclopedIa of comparatIve laW 14 (René David ed., 1975) (completed by the author 
in July 1973). A more recent discussion of the Western legal tradition can be found 
in Antonio Gambaro, Western Legal Tradition, in 3 the neW palgrave dIctIonary of 
economIcs and the laW 687 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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into various casebooks), was necessary to inaugurate a politically 
unavoidable claim of unity of capitalist countries.70
The whole Encyclopedia exudes the effects of Cold War equilib-
ria. To begin, Victor Knapp—a leading Czechoslovakian jurist and 
professor in Prague for many years active in teaching the socialist 
legal family at the FIDC—received the honor and the responsibility 
of editing the first, and perhaps most politically delicate, volume, six 
years in the making when it appeared in 1972. The introduction to 
the work, which was on Knapp’s desk during the Prague Spring of 
1968, acknowledges the political contentiousness of the enterprise. 
While falling short of claiming political neutrality, the famous jurist 
defends certain standards of scientific honesty capable of defeat-
ing political arbitrariness. He claims political responsibility for any 
final choice in contentious matters (mostly the recognition of the 
statehood of some, rather than other, contested Cold War entities). 
The entry on the USSR was collectively authored by the Institute of 
State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, a clear sign 
of political distension brokered by the authority of Knapp. In Volume 
II on the “Different Conceptions of Law,” whose long introduction 
was completed in January 1972, René David displays an “integrative 
spirit”71 by acknowledging, alongside the usual claim of the possibil-
ity and desirability of scientific comparison, that Western legalism 
could learn from different visions, where law has a less prominent 
role. While it is difficult to interpret whether David had in mind 
socialist legality, it is a fact that he gave up his famous classifica-
tion. He determined that the common law and civil law were to stay 
together within a Western conception of law, located immediately 
before the chapter on the “Socialist Conception of Law,” completed in 
January 1970 by the leading Hungarian comparatist Imre Szabo.72
However, this integrative approach could not be carried to 
its logical conclusion of suggesting in the Marxian tradition, that 
all that mattered was the contrast between bourgeois and social-
ist structures of production.73 While the early clear-cut opposition 
between civil law and common law was discussed anew in light of a 
more integrative platform, it remained a stronghold of comparative 
law shared by all possible classifications. David, Zweigert and Koetz, 
Costantinesco, and Schlesinger all maintained the opposition at the 
70. The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, under the auspices of 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 
can be considered the most ambitious attempt generated in the scientific maturity 
of the discipline. The project, conceived in the early to mid-1960s, generated its first 
published result in 1 natIonal reports (Victor Knapp ed., 1972). See Adolf Sprudzs, 
The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law: A Bibliographical Status 
Report, 28 am. j. comp. l. 93 (1980).
71. R. Schlesinger, The Past and the Future of Comparative Law, 43 am. j. comp. 
l. 477 (1995).
72. Imre Szabo, The Socialist Conception of Law, in InternatIonal encyclopedIa 
of comparatIve laW, supra note 69, at 49.
73. See hugh collIns, marxIsm and laW (1984).
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core of their taxonomies, but at the same time reserved an undispu-
table hard “contrastive” approach in making socialist law the “third 
family” of legal systems.74 Here the classifying principle was politi-
cal, but not to the point of acknowledging the very “incomparability” 
between communist law and bourgeois law.
This effort to produce a self-congratulatory capitalist iden-
tity, going beyond legal positivism, and the rebuttal to the claim of 
incomparability between capitalist and socialist law explains the 
dramatic and sudden transformation of the discipline in the 1950s 
and 1960s.75 The theoretical refusal of the very comparability of two 
superstructures (such as the law) remained popular in the Soviet 
Union well after the purge of Pashukanis in 1937. Actually, after the 
erosion of the East–West relationships from early 1946, the tone of 
the Agitprop (the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)) became much more 
hostile, and various campaigns against “cosmopolitanism” were mak-
ing it very difficult for Soviet scholars to even claim the superiority 
of socialist legality over bourgeois legality in the footsteps of Andrej 
Vishinsky. Getting materials from abroad, or even publishing in a 
language other than Russian, would expose a Soviet scholar to the 
potential accusation of servility to the West. Similar troubles were 
experienced by American scholars, whose independent research on 
the Soviet world was simply impossible under the regime of FBI and 
CIA campus surveillance, which included infiltration.76 The Cold War 
phantom was making self-censorship the rule on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain.
Western comparatists still convinced of the universalistic 
claim of their knowledge77 and eager to access international and 
area study money, developed a legal taxonomy capable at the same 
time of claiming a structural distinction between law and politics 
and the comparability of the socialist legal order with its bour-
geois counterpart. Clearly, within this scenario, the description of 
the Soviet legal system in derogatory, or at least condescending, 
terms was not even a conscious move. It was simply the zeitgeist’s 
impact on the profession of comparative law. Paradoxically, and 
74. An updated discussion of the “three families” can be found in schlesInger’s 
comparatIve laW 654 (Ugo Mattei, Teemu Ruskola & Antonio Gidi eds., 7th ed. 2009).
75. The foundation of the American Journal of Comparative Law in 1952 has 
generated the intellectual infrastructure for this epistemic transformation. English 
rapidly became the lingua franca of the profession and the Journal (an Organ of 
the Society) was animated by Sovietologists such as Hazard and by the best refu-
gee scholars by then in their full maturity. The Journal has determined the global 
Americanization of the comparative legal profession.
76. Abundant evidence for Columbia, Harvard, and Yale is offered by dIamond, 
supra note 66.
77. The critique of ethnocentrism of such kind of universalism was yet to reach 
the comparative law mainstream. Only from the late ’90s of the last century did such 
a critique emerge at conferences organized at the University of Utah, University of 
Michigan, and University of California Hastings.
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especially in the United States, comparative law developed in those 
years both a higher degree of methodological sophistication and a 
full-fledged Wilsonian missionary spirit that the more rudimentary 
early work did not include. The Western comparative law commu-
nity was attempting to shelter socialist colleagues from their pre-
sumed intellectual oppression while failing to recognize its own. 
The Faculté Internationale de Droit Comparé exuded this spirit to 
the very end of the Cold War.78
Iv. the trIpartIte taxonomy and Its varIatIons
Someone looking at the leading introductions to comparative 
law cited above will conclude that, in the 1950s, the discipline had 
reached its scholarly maturity by two different, though related 
moves. First, it had attempted to produce a taxonomy capable of 
grouping the legal systems of the world into families according to 
some organizing principle. Second, it had begun to challenge the 
excessively sharp tone of the distinction between common law and 
civil law. Both these moves, I submit, cannot be interpreted only 
as an evolution of the skills of the participant in the comparative 
law enterprise. Rather, they are the product of social and politi-
cal processes driven to a significant extent by the specific histori-
cal conditions of the time—processes that produced ideology in 
the specific meaning of false consciousness, unveiled by the logi-
cal inconsistency of deploying at the same time the contrastive 
(with socialist law) and the integrative (common law/civil law) 
approaches.
Leaving aside the very complex (and quite futile) debate on the 
criteria according by which to classify legal systems into a family,79 
Soviet law emerged as an object of scientific comparison for the first 
time in the early taxonomies. In Schlesinger, it was the “third family” 
after common law and civil law; in David’s version, it was one of the 
three families positively described (the fourth one being the “resid-
ual” family of “other conceptions of law”); in Zweigert and Koetz too, 
it maintained an autonomous status. Further, the criteria of distinc-
tion among the different families were vague, somewhat blurred, and 
linked to notions requiring quite a bit of belaboring to be understood 
(it took Merryman to clarify the meaning of style80). In contrast, 
socialist law was distinguished very clearly from capitalist law, a 
78. I was a student of the Faculté in 1980 and later in the early ’90s a profes-
sor in the same institution that praised itself as being the only place where socialist 
comparative law scholars and students were “allowed” to meet capitalist colleagues 
for significant lengths of time. I remember rumors, of course void of any evidence, of 
reciprocal surveillance between socialist students and faculty.
79. See schlesInger’s comparatIve laW, supra note 74.
80. See John H. Merryman, The Italian Style II: Law, 18 stan. l. rev. 396 
(1965–1966).
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distinction that only needed to extend to the law on which the oppo-
sition based the political-economic option to nationalize the means of 
production. Marx himself provided the criteria by describing the law 
as a superstructure of the class relationship. This genuinely Marxist 
aspect of Soviet legal identity, rejected during the debate over the 
comparability of Soviet law with capitalist law, while openly used in 
drafting the first comparative taxonomies, introduced more contra-
diction by denouncing the rather feeble scientific claim of compara-
tive legal taxonomy.81
When comparative law had reached its “functionalist-structural-
ist” maturity,82 the unease of bourgeois comparatists about recogniz-
ing a genuine identity of socialist law as an alternative to capitalist 
legal arrangements emerged quite clearly. Sacco, for instance, in a 
famous article on the “civil law substratum” of socialist law, consid-
ered the most significant aspects of socialist legality as an addendum 
to a deeper civil law tradition, which, according to his analysis, was 
much more relevant in understanding socialist law then any work on 
the economic structure.83 Even clearer was the ex post “confession” 
of Koetz. He did not stop short of just taking away the chapter on 
socialist law from his introduction in the third edition following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, as if the political demise of the Soviet Union 
and the return of its Western satellites in the capitalist orbit was 
enough to consider the socialist experience historically irrelevant. 
Koetz wrote in the introduction that his erasure would spare the 
reader some sixty pages!
There are a variety of implications in this quite schizophrenic 
Western admission and denial of socialist legal identity as relevant 
for comparative law. Very evident is a degree of insistence on the cen-
tral position of private law for purposes of comparison. The message 
is (a) only private law is genuinely law; and (b) public law is a contin-
gency intimately connected with a positivistic state-centered vision.
These two Western-centric biases are indeed a self-fulfilling 
prophecy because the first conception happens to be the one devel-
oped in the Western legal tradition as an incident of the proprietary 
origins of Roman law. The second is the same enduring vision accord-
ing to which the stronger is the government, the weaker the individ-
ual rights.84
81. For a strong description of Soviet law as party politics, see john n. hazard, 
communIsts and theIr laW (1969). This description of socialist legality as ultimately 
arbitrary is in the classic book by otto kIrchheImer, polItIcal justIce: the use of 
legal procedure for polItIcal ends (1961).
82. See rethInkIng the masters of comparatIve laW, supra note 33.
83. See Rodolfo Sacco, The Romanist Substratum in the Civil Law of the Socialist 
Countries, 14 rev. socIalIst L. 65 (1988).
84. See frItjof capra & ugo matteI, the ecology of laW: toWards a legal system 
In tune WIth nature and communIty (2015).
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In such a strategy, long deployed by orientalists to deny legal 
subjectivity to China, public law can be added to and subtracted 
from the “real” legal system which remains rooted in the private law 
tradition.
In retrospect, this move, in deep contradiction with the most 
important theoretical results of the taxonomic phase of comparative 
law, is also a product of the dynamics of the Cold War. I refer here to 
the separation made by the early introductions to comparative law 
between Chinese law and Soviet law, where only the latter was con-
sidered a member of the socialist law family, while the former was 
classified in a different “family of legal systems” carved out of the 
orientalist criteria of static Confucian adherence and oriental despo-
tism.85 It is quite clear that if China and its cultural orbit (Vietnam 
and North Korea) are denied socialist subjectivity, the political fall 
of the USSR can be extended to the whole socialist model, doing vio-
lence only to Cuba (and perhaps later to Venezuela) which can be 
easily dismissed because of the scarcity of the population.
The separation of the USSR and China into two different fami-
lies of legal systems certainly reflects the scholarly tradition in 
Western academe, where Sinology and Sovietology are two under-
standably different domains of area studies (if for no other reason 
than linguistic barriers), distinct from the actual reach of Marxism–
Leninism. To be sure, if the criteria of classification were coherently 
political, there would be no reasons to consider China after 1949 
as an outsider to the socialist family.86 However, one has to con-
sider that Mao had just seized power nationwide when comparative 
law inaugurated the taxonomic era, and that not much was known 
about the genuinely socialist legal system introduced in the large 
part of the country under communist control since 1930 and dur-
ing the Long March.87 China being largely rural, and the Cultural 
Revolution far off in the future, one could have argued (with catego-
ries developed later) that a traditional legal system was still hege-
monic in the fifties in China. Moreover, other much more relevant 
historical processes were to separate China from the USSR when the 
issue of the succession of Stalin in international communist leader-
ship arose in 1953.
While it is impossible to say whether comparatists would have 
kept China (and its orbit) outside of the socialist family if the Soviets 
had recognized Mao’s leadership, it is a fact that the political division 
85. See ruskola, supra note 62.
86. See id. There is no question that, especially after the launch of the Sputnik, 
the USSR was perceived as a much more serious competitor than Maoist China 
(which was easily “expelled” from the UN). Hence, once more the comparative law 
“status” of the two socialist countries was reflective of political determinations in the 
United States.
87. See schlesInger’s comparatIve laW, supra note 74.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/65/3/567/4563343
by UC Hastings Law Library user
on 23 February 2018
585THE COLD WAR AND COMPARATIVE LAW2017]
within the block was coherent with the comparative taxonomy at 
the time. Dividing political socialism in the perspective of compara-
tive analysis has certainly helped in weakening socialist law as an 
alternative to the Western legal tradition (bourgeois legal phase if we 
wish to see it with socialist eyes). The heavy toll of this ideological 
move (no matter if strategic or just induced by political events) was 
to be paid after 1989 when legal Sovietology was all but dismantled 
and generalist comparative lawyers could seriously claim that the 
family of socialist law was extinct, in spite of over 1.5 billion people 
being ruled by communist parties worldwide.88 Obviously, the num-
ber significantly increases if one considers, in addition to China, 
the populations of Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, as nations still 
ruled by post-socialist Leninist party organizations. However, the 
separation between China and the USSR was also a Cold War move 
to “divide and rule” intellectually, carried out throughout area stud-
ies, and which has precluded Western comparative law from genu-
inely understanding the communist conception of law.
Ultimately, the early taxonomies of comparative law show 
quite an interesting schizophrenia of adherence to (or critique of) 
Pashukanis and Vishinsky. Comparatists have sided both with the 
former, in agreeing that, ultimately, law is essentially private and 
commercial in nature, and with the latter, in seeing socialist pub-
lic law as intimately connected with the new socialist bureaucratic 
state.89 Nevertheless, it has been the Cold War confrontation that 
carried the debate over taxonomy at the center of the comparative 
legal agenda. The ensuing unavoidable reflection on the political and 
geostrategic conditions of our comparative knowledge triggered later 
self-reflection at the fall of the Berlin Wall including some under-
standing of our own disciplinary ethnocentrism.90
v. comparaBIlIty as a BourgeoIs crItIQue to the marxIst canon: 
Beyond legal posItIvIsm In comparatIve laW
In a more general perspective, the taxonomic phase of compara-
tive law meant going beyond legal positivism that had characterized 
the phase of législation comparée. Legal families, to be sure, needed 
organizational principles deeper than the mere contingency of leg-
islation and of the official sources of law. No legislator or political 
authority can decide whether their own country belongs to common 
law or civil law, which are traditions as such (akin to the language 
88. The Review of Socialist Law, first published in Holland in 1975 and which 
provided a forum for comparative discussion for Western Sovietologists (and which 
included articles on socialist countries outside of the USSR), abruptly changed its 
name in 1991 to become the Review of Central and East European Law.
89. See collIns, supra note 73.
90. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s 
Legal Systems, 45 am. j. comp. L. 5 (1997).
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spoken by the people) and beyond the reach of a legislator.91 Being 
a common law or a civil law country is not an arbitrary political 
choice; rather, it involves a legacy of history and deep structure. In 
this perspective, socialist law as a family of legal systems (or a legal 
tradition) creates some problems: one socialist revolution would not 
be enough to make a family of socialist law.92 Indeed, it took quite 
a while after 1917 for Western comparatists to speak about a fam-
ily of socialist law. Socialist law was recognized, albeit reluctantly, 
as a legal family after quite a significant phase of experimentation, 
which included sophisticated intellectual debate over the relation-
ship between law and socialism (the Pashukanis versus Vishinsky 
confrontation in the ’30s) and original institutional construction 
(such as the Prokuratura or the different models of socialist prop-
erty law).93
In a sense, the recognition of socialist law as a family of legal 
systems, which also gave rise to a fairly fundamental rethinking of 
the nature of the opposition between civil law and common law, was 
a hostile move in the Cold War context.94 In spite of the fact that 
Lenin was a lawyer, and actually a very good one, who, from the 
1920s until his death, had contributed much to the development of 
global legal civilization and consciousness,95 Marxist theory reduced 
legality to a superstructure of the bourgeois system of production. 
Marx interpreted law as a contingent product of the bourgeois phase 
of capitalist development, something that a socialist system should 
deploy only as a lesser evil, but that is bound to disappear with the 
eradication of the class system. Marx never needed to distinguish 
common law from civil law; and Marxism, in opposition to the liberal 
agenda, uses class, not the individual person, as the social building 
block, with the consequence that socialist law is but an oxymoron—
certainly not an autonomous institutional setting understandable in 
its own terms.
While Marx offered the theoretical foundation of this vision of 
law as a class-specific device of the bourgeoisie, it took Pashukanis, 
the Soviet legal scholar most respected in the West, to develop 
a full-fledged theory of law as a byproduct of the needs of contrac-
tual transactions and of the necessarily individualizing structure 
91. See rené davId, major legal systems In the World today (1968). See also 
patrIck glenn, legal tradItIons of the World: sustaIned dIversIty In laW (5th ed. 
2014).
92. See Ugo Mattei, Socialist and Non-Socialist Approaches to Land Law in 
Somalia and Other African States, 16 rev. socIalIst l. 17 (1990).
93. See gIanmarIa ajanI, la proprIeta delle organIzzazIonI socIalI nel dIrItto deI 
paesI socIalIstI (1988); Boris N. Mamlyuk, Early Soviet Property Law in Comparison 
With Western Legal Traditions, in research handBook on polItIcal economy and laW 
454 (Ugo Mattei & John D. Haskell eds., 2015).
94. See hazard, supra note 81.
95. See QuIgley, supra note 4.
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of the idea of commercial exchange.96 In Pashukanis’s understand-
ing, because law was structurally a product of the capitalist order, 
it would make little sense to compare it with the socialist order.97 
Either we would be comparing a fading superstructure of a new 
socialist structure (socialist legality) with a superstructure in a 
previous phase, or we would compare two radically different struc-
tures (socialism and capitalism), which is not the task of a lawyer. 
Pashukanis was writing in a polemic with Peteris Stucka, the Chief 
Justice of the Soviet Supreme Court, who believed in the transforma-
tion of bourgeois legality into socialist legality as a consequence of 
the Revolution. Socialist legality, in Stucka’s Hegelian vision, was the 
outcome of a dialectic between the bourgeois thesis and the revolu-
tionary antithesis. Stucka was one of Lenin’s most important legal 
advisers in the early phase of the NEP and, unlike Pashukanis, he 
denied the inextricable connection between law and capitalist com-
mercial transactions.98
After Stalin’s decision to consolidate socialism in just one coun-
try, the attitude of Soviet Russia toward law had changed dramati-
cally, as Stalin incrementally deployed the law for political purposes, 
including the elimination of political opposition (the famous trial 
of Nikolaj Ivanovič Bucharin is a case in point) and campaigns of 
reeducation. Indeed, the use of legal decisions as devices of mass 
education on socialist legality is a recognized feature of the “style” 
of socialist law.99 The hero of Stalin’s intellectual emancipation 
from traditional Marxist theory of legality as an exquisitely bour-
geois project was Andrej Vishinsky who, in a radical critique of 
Pashukanis, theorized the inherent superiority of socialist legality as 
opposed to the bourgeois one.100 Socialism needs law permanently, he 
contended, as well as a strong state with a monopoly of the sources of 
law.101 Neither Stucka’s idea of an instrumental use of law in transi-
tion, nor the genuinely Marxist vision of a fading of law and state 
in transition to communism, could serve the conservative turn taken 
by Stalin. To Vishinsky, law was not a lesser evil but rather a noble 
device allowing for the organization of a permanently structured 
socialist state. A drastically teleological vision of law as a means to 
a political end emerged in the wake of the dramatic events that took 
place between Lenin’s (and Stucka’s) death in 1924 and Pashukanis’s 
96. See collIns, supra note 73. See also Mamlyuk, supra note 93; harold j. 
Berman, justIce In the ussr: an InterpretatIon of sovIet laW 20 (1963).
97. See pashukanIs, supra note 29.
98. See peter I. stucka, selected WrItIngs on sovIet laW and marxIsm (Peter 
Maggs et al. eds., 1988). For a discussion and a rich bibliography on the role of ide-
ology in the making of the Soviet legal family, see Gianmaria Ajani, Diritto Dell’ 
Europa Orientale, in trattato dI dIrItto comparato 35ff. (Rodolfo Sacco ed., 1996).
99. See InternatIonal encyclopedIa of comparatIve laW, supra note 69.
100. See andrey y. vIshInsky, the laW of the sovIet state (1948).
101. For a critical reading, see gIanmarIa ajanI, le fontI non scrItte nel dIrItto deI 
paesI socIalIstI (1985).
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execution in 1937. In spite, or maybe because, of these events (which 
included the promulgation of the Soviet Constitution in 1936), the 
idea that “socialist legality” was little more than camouflaged politi-
cal expediency remained strong in the Western perception of Soviet 
law. The description of the socialist legal family in Western compar-
ative law books as “lacking” the rule of law is perfectly compatible 
with the quite banal critique of Vishinsky to Pashukanis.102
Pashukanis’s vision triggered the early theory of non-compa-
rability of socialist and bourgeois law, advanced by many social-
ist legal authors (the best known being A.A. Tille), influenced by 
Pashukanis’s school, which was in its heyday at the peak of the Cold 
War. According to this vision, coherently based on a notion of law 
as a superstructure of the process of production, there is simply no 
meaningful comparison possible on the analytical ground between 
prerevolutionary, bourgeois law and the socialist model.103
Interestingly, Vishinsky’s opposing vision also led Soviet compar-
ative jurisprudence to the same results of denying meaningful com-
parability. This time, the denial was based on normative rather than 
analytical grounds. Socialist law was “inherently superior” to previ-
ous and contemporary bourgeois law, as an expression of the people 
at a more advanced stage of political development. Any scientific 
comparison with bourgeois law, other than the mere accumulation of 
evidence in support of this truth, would be meaningless, since social-
ist law had nothing to learn from its capitalist neighbors.104 A science 
of comparative law could only emerge in the study of the different 
ways in which the different Soviet republics pursued the same task 
of building a sturdy socialist system of state and law.105
The fundamental agreement on non-comparability flourished 
practically unchallenged on the Eastern part of the Iron Curtain 
through the Cold War. Of course, Western comparatists, who dealt 
with the issue, discussed nuances developed over time and space 
across the socialist law family.106 For instance, they detected some 
limited openings in post-Stalinist USSR due to an increase in aca-
demic dialogue, especially with Central European scholars at the 
102. See Berman, supra note 96, at 20ff.
103. anatolII tIlle, sotsIalIstIcheskoye sravnItelnoye pravovedenIe (1975).
104. See p.s. romaskIn, amnIstIja I pomIlovanIe v sssr 2, 144 (1959) (as cited by 
ajanI, supra note 93, at 53):
Soviet jurists that together with Western colleagues take part in 
organizational activities in the domain of comparative law must 
remember that their role is to promote the diffusion and the  
knowledge of the Soviet conception of the law and of its historical supe-
riority. They should never (as unfortunately sometimes happens) find 
out analogies between Soviet and bourgeois law outside of that purpose.
105. See A.F. Chebanov, Science du droit comparé en USSR, 27 revue InternatIon-
ale de droIt comparé 121 (1975).
106. See ajanI, supra note 93, at 49ff.
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periphery of Soviet law. However, the single most important issue 
addressed by comparatists dealing with the Soviet–capitalist divide 
was the discussion of whether it was possible to compare the two to 
begin with.107
I submit that a number of features of Western comparative law 
have been determined by a professional desire to confront the issue 
of non-comparability with a number of mirror moves. First, by mak-
ing Soviet law one of the world legal families in all the early taxono-
mies constructed in comparative law, comparatists were showing 
that a scientific comparison was actually possible because they were 
not “afraid” of the deep differences.108
Second, by emphasizing the extraordinary complexity, richness, 
and sophistication of the theories of sources of law in common law 
and civil law, comparatists could point at the “underdevelopment” 
of the Soviet theory of the sources of law as a matter of continu-
ity between prerevolutionary tsarist and postrevolutionary social-
ist law.109 Thus, with just one move (emphasizing the sources), they 
could hit two targets. First, they could claim that discontinuity was 
just revolutionary ideology, because politics can never completely 
determine the legal system in its autopoiesis.110 Second, they argued 
for the superiority of Western jurisprudence, and more generally of 
the Western model of liberal democracy considering it a pluralistic 
system with an open and highly theorized understanding of the for-
mal and informal sources of law. This feature, in opposition to the 
rudimentary state-centric Stalinist vision, was a common aspect of 
both the common law and the civil law traditions. Such a politically 
motivated analysis by Western comparatists contributed a great deal 
to moving comparative law beyond the black letter stage.
Thus, because of the Cold War, the critique of legal positivism, 
which remains today a distinctive methodological trait of compara-
tive law, made, at the beginning of the taxonomic phase, a signifi-
cant step forward. If a legal system is taken in its complexity, the 
legislator cannot be seen as the ultimate sovereign. Soviet law sim-
ply cannot choose discontinuity or declare incomparability, since in a 
correct scientific perception, it is quite different from the monolithic 
107. On the contents of a 1958 meeting of the International Association of Legal 
Sciences held in Warsaw with some admissions that the comparative method could be 
deployed in comparing laws stemming from different economic structures, see Janos 
Tòth, Comparative Law in Eastern Europe, 2 J. Int'l comm'n jurIsts 245, 250ff. (1965).
108. See this doctrine as restated by Sacco, supra note 45.
109. The idea of continuity between tsarist autocracy and communist party rule 
is a classic topos of U.S. Cold War rhetoric. See, e.g., Richard Thornburgh, The Soviet 
Union and the Rule of Law, 69 foreIgn aff. 18 (1990).
110. See harold Berman, laW and revolutIon: the formatIon of the Western legal 
tradItIon (1983); James Gordley, Myths of the French Civil Code, 42 am. j. comp. L. 
459 (1994).
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description offered by domestic lawyers.111 These lawyers are either 
ideologically driven or fearful of the political consequences of their 
actions in a totalitarian society. In the real life of the law, scientifi-
cally understood through correct methods, there is no such thing as 
a supreme sovereign ruler capable of deciding the law that remains 
autopoietic by nature. There is a limit to what a sovereign can 
choose, even if he is Stalin (or Napoleon before him). Certainly, the 
ruler cannot decide to what legal family his state belongs. A decla-
ration of that kind would be as ridiculous as that of Woody Allen’s 
dictator in Bananas declaring to an astonished Spanish-speaking 
population that from now on the official language would be Swedish!
A direct consequence of this scientific claim of comparative law 
as a self-perceived methodology capable of objective, nonideological 
choice is the division of the socialist block into two separate fami-
lies. Even before the political break-up of the USSR and China (over 
international leadership in the socialist world in the wake of Stalin’s 
death), both David and Zweigert and Koetz had decided that China 
would not be part of socialist law. In a paradigmatic orientalist 
move, which, since Hegel, had denied China any capacity to evolve 
away from the Confucian worldview, the early scientific comparat-
ists insisted on firmly locking the “far eastern” Chinese legal sys-
tem in the orbit of “other conceptions” of law.112 Again, it was a Cold 
War move to divide the socialist world. A move whose clear ideologi-
cal inspiration (dubbed scientific) proved useful to legitimize the all 
but total erasure of socialist law from the global map of legal sys-
tems that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. As 
mentioned before, Hein Koetz followed exactly that strategy when, 
right after the German unification, he simply omitted the chap-
ter on socialist law from the new edition of his classic, coauthored 
with Konrad Zweigert. Interestingly, that hasty move was in blatant 
contradiction to the claim of continuity and insufficiency of political 
determination in front of the complexity of the sources of law that 
comparatists had deployed before: the end of history in comparative 
law!
vI. the common core of legal systems
What was the correct scientific method that Western comparat-
ists could deploy while their ideologically driven colleagues on 
the other side of the Iron Curtain could not, for fear or intellectual 
inferiority? To be sure, until the 1950s the comparative law schol-
arly community had little intellectual sophistication to display with 
pride.113 Comparative law had just entered its taxonomic phase 
111. ajanI, supra note 93.
112. See schlesInger’s comparatIve laW, supra note 74.
113. Full awareness of this state of affairs is displayed in the preface to 
schlesInger, supra note 39.
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and, in retrospect, we know it did it with a blatant display of eth-
nocentrism. True, Schlesinger and Gorla (on Rabel’s shoulders) were 
already beginning to deploy an impressive factual method of inquiry 
in an effort to actually compare, rather than merely juxtapose, differ-
ent systems; however, it was not until the end of the decade that the 
common core became recognizable as a full-fledged methodological 
step forward in our discipline.114
Interestingly, while David and Zweigert and Koetz were still 
using a fundamentally contrastive approach to comparative law, 
just shifting the “formidable intellectual barriers” from the national 
boundaries of the different states to those between different families 
of legal systems, Gorla and Schlesinger (with Lorenz and Bonassis) 
where inaugurating an integrative era, where the focus on analo-
gies was much more powerful than that on differences.115 Both these 
approaches owed much to the Cold War climate. The contrastive con-
struction of socialist law as a legal family significantly different from 
(and smaller than) the reach of political socialism,116 allowed com-
paratists to make two claims. First, political choices are weaker than 
cultural traditions.117 Secondly, the comparative professional project 
was not afraid of deep differences because comparison across fami-
lies was still possible, and comparing a socialist country with a com-
mon law or civil law one was no more difficult than comparing any 
European legal system with, say, an African or an Asian one, regard-
less of the political context. In the contrastive vision, moreover, there 
was a not so well hidden bias in favor of the higher degree of legal 
civilization of the common law and of the “more advanced” civil law 
jurisdictions, to use the terminology that appeared in the first case-
book of comparative law, i.e., Schlesinger’s masterpiece.118
114. The methodological issues and the “improvement” in the canon of research 
is discussed already at length in Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Common Core of 
Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study, in tWentIeth-century 
comparatIve and conflIcts laW: legal essays In honor of hessel e. yntema 65 (1961). 
An impressive bibliography on work about the common core before the publication of 
the results of the Cornell seminars with some twenty articles published worldwide 
between 1957 and 1967 can be found in formatIon of contracts, supra note 65, at 
62–65.
115. See G. Gorla, La “logica illogica” del consensualismo o dell’ incontro dei con-
sensi e il suo tramonto, 12 rIvIsta dIrItto cIvile 255 (1966).
116. See John D. Hazard, The Soviet Pattern Spreads Abroad, U. Ill. L.F. 277 
(1964).
117. This was, as discussed, the justification to keep China outside of the family. 
See id.
118. schlesInger, supra note 39. Already in the first edition, he displays the idea 
that the most meaningful comparison (worth undertaking to learn from foreign expe-
rience) is that between systems with comparable degrees of development. In the 
Introduction to formatIon of contracts, supra note 65, at 22, Schlesinger cites Italian 
scholar Tullio Ascarelli in a claim that methodologically sophisticated comparative 
law boils down to a dialogue between common law and civil law to discuss the Cornell 
treatment of Islamic and Egyptian law as “developing legal systems.”
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It would be difficult to deny that the most important and charac-
teristic methodological step forward in our discipline was the inau-
guration of the integrative method of the common core approach at 
Cornell.119 Schlesinger headed the project, which inquired into the 
issue of contract formation, as a Ford Foundation project for some 
ten years. The project attracted many international scholars to 
Cornell (including Gino Gorla), and generated an impressive two-
volume publication, which has since set the standard for functional-
ist integrative comparative law. The treatment of “communist law” 
(this was the term used in the publication) at Cornell requires some 
expansion. To begin with, Schlesinger shared the idea that commu-
nist law was a family of legal systems. Interestingly, that was the 
only family treated as such in the “communist legal systems annota-
tions,” the only ones in the two volumes organized by family and not 
by nationality. Second, in a footnote to the introduction, Schlesinger 
seems to believe that for the purpose of his study, the communist 
family includes China, where “the position (in the early 1960’s) does 
not seem to have been radically different.”120 Third, the only legal 
system in that family that the project actually discusses at length is 
Poland, thanks to the help of W.J. Wagner, a Western-trained Polish 
professor in the faculty at Indiana.
Schlesinger explicitly correlated the issue of inclusion or exclu-
sion of communist law with that of comparability of contract law in a 
planned as opposed to market economy. He devoted a few masterful 
pages in his introductory chapter on socialist legal systems,121 and, 
while acknowledging the “seriousness” of the issue of (un)compara-
bility,122 he undertook a typically functionalist examination of the 
question, with all the sophistication that made him the undisputed 
global master of the field for a half century. The objective of the 
Cornell project was to “[s]tudy the contract law of several socialist 
nations for the very purpose of determining comparability. In other 
words, the question of comparability was to be determined after, 
and not before, an attempt to compare.”123  The issue eventually was 
“solved,” based on the tremendous authority of the common core proj-
ect, unsurprisingly in favor of scientifically determined comparabil-
ity (as opposed to ideological incomparability). The question, which 
119. On its potential for current days’ inquiry, see Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, 
The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 3 colum. j. eur. L. 339 (1998).
120. schlesInger, supra note 39, at 24 n.16.
121. formatIon of contracts, supra note 65, at 211. Schlesinger refers to further 
discussion to his cited 1961 article. He seems to use the term communist and socialist 
as synonymous.
122. “Western scholars though not subscribing to the ideological premises under-
lying this view of their socialist colleagues, have to admit that there is a question of 
comparability which requires a serious examination.” Id. at 23 (citing rené davId & 
günther grassman, eInführung In dIe grossen rechtssysteme der gegenmWart (1996)).
123. formatIon of contracts, supra note 65, at 23.
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was as ideological (or unideological) in the West as it was in the 
USSR, had been on Schlesinger’s mind for quite a long time. Already 
in July 1961,124 he travelled to Trier, where no less than Joseph 
Esser (one of the towering figures in the critique of legalistic posi-
tivism) had organized a discussion (sponsored by the International 
Association of Legal Sciences125) on the comparability of legal institu-
tions in the field of contract and property.
In his common core discussion of communist law, Schlesinger 
would not go as far as to deny that the subject matter of contract 
formation—the core of private law—raised research questions that 
would not do justice to the specificities of socialist legality, tailored as 
it was on economic planning:
For the purpose of discussion, the argument against compa-
rability may be stated in the following over-simplified form: 
1. In a socialist economy contracts governed by the civil 
code or by similar provisions of private law are of practical 
importance only within a strictly limited sphere of economic 
activities. 2. The important transactions are those concluded 
among socialist enterprises in fulfilment of a Plan, and such 
transactions are not comparable to private contracts of the 
traditional type. Hence, it follows 3. That what is compara-
ble in this area is relatively unimportant and what is impor-
tant is not comparable.126
To Schlesinger, the answer to this simplistic syllogism is in the key 
characters of common core research, the very methodological step 
forward that his sophisticated method of inquiry was contributing to 
comparative law:
Closer examination shows, however that this argument is 
based on unwarranted generalizations. In the first place, the 
various “socialist” systems differ from each other in their 
treatment of contracts between socialist enterprises . . . even 
with respect to the countries which adhere to a more conser-
vative reading of socialist doctrine it appears that neither 
part 1 nor part 2 of the argument can be maintained with-
out serious qualifications throwing doubt on the soundness 
of the conclusion.127
124. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Trier Conference on Comparative Law, 10 am. j. 
comp. L. 508 (1961).
125. The Association, grouping together the various national organizations of com-
parative lawyers, is another Cold War-generated institution aimed at demonstrating 
comparability and ultimately the scientific and nonpolitical nature of legal compar-
ativism. Founded in 1950 as the International Committee of Comparative Law of 
UNESCO, it received its current name in 1955 and remains under UNESCO auspices 
with its seat in Paris where the UNESCO headquarters are located.
126. See formatIon of contracts, supra note 65, at 22–23.
127. Id. at 25. As to countries not adhering to the conservative vision, Schlesinger 
cites Yugoslavia.
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It would be beyond the scope of this Article to follow the master in 
introducing all the relevant qualifications of contract law, both in 
its codified form and in its practice, that would appear relevant “to 
ascertaining the common core of legal systems” within the socialist 
and capitalist purview. Especially interesting is Schlesinger’s analy-
sis of Kontrahierungszwang (compulsion to contract) as developing in 
capitalist countries that may show a convergence with the contrac-
tual duties of the plan.128
It is exactly in this analysis, aimed to show in practice the com-
parability among systems with very different substantive sources of 
law (and even ideologies) that the common core hypothesis, appears 
at its best.129 Far from politically neutral, and clearly imbedded in 
scientific positivism in the best tradition of American Legal Realism, 
Schlesinger moves gigantic steps forward away from juxtaposition to 
comparison.
The old pre-taxonomic tradition of comparative law has proved 
incapable of thinking outside the box of the jurisdictional bound-
aries between the states because the early students of législation 
comparée simply reflected that the “formidable intellectual bar-
riers” between states created by codification in the civil law and 
by the demise of Latin as the legal lingua franca in the continen-
tal European tradition. David’s and Zweigert and Koetz’s contras-
tive taxonomic approach challenged state positivism, but it certainly 
bought into many of the common places of the previous phase. These 
early scientific comparatists portrayed the opposition between com-
mon law and civil law as one of magnitude, comparable to that 
between a capitalist and a socialist organization. It was only with 
the integrative approach of the common core that comparative law 
was able to move beyond taxonomy and into actual comparison based 
on a single standard for both capitalist and socialist legal systems. 
This approach allowed a first fundamental distinction between laws 
in action, as applied to real-life cases, and the description of the law 
produced by the very different forms it takes in the different legal 
families. Comparative law, short of remaining a mere tool for gaining 
a more international perspective, as it had been done in the United 
States since the early twentieth century, became a thorough effort 
of actual comparison of practical solutions. In struggling to reach an 
128. Schlesinger, to make his point, cites towering figures of Western private law 
scholarship: André Tunc, La possibilité de comparer le contrat dans des systèmes 
juridiques à structures economiques différentes, 27 raBelsz 478 (1962); Frederich 
Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and 
Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 harv. l. rev. 401, 409–12 (1964).
129. Much later in the Common Core of European Private Law Project (launched 
in 1993 and still ongoing) we would talk about “meta-legal formants” to spell out 
the relevant contextual differences. The terminology is borrowed from Sacco, supra 
note 45. See Ugo Mattei, The Comparative Jurisprudence of Schlesinger and Sacco: A 
Study in Legal Influence, in rethInkIng the masters of comparatIve laW, supra note 
33; Bussani & Mattei, supra note 119.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/65/3/567/4563343
by UC Hastings Law Library user
on 23 February 2018
595THE COLD WAR AND COMPARATIVE LAW2017]
unbiased factual hypothesis to base discussion on, comparatists at 
Cornell were actually fine-tuning their methodology and discovering 
an impressive number of factors relevant for an effort to avoid preju-
dices created by the unexplored biases of each national professional 
tradition.130
The inclusion of communist law in the study of the formation 
of contracts—the subject of the Cornell seminars—was a bold step 
beyond the sterile methodological discussions that were taking place 
(and were to continue well into the eighties) between comparatists 
both in the capitalist and in the socialist world. A passion for idle 
methodological discussion, brilliantly diagnosed as a product of the 
Cinderella complex of our discipline, has certainly contributed quite 
a bit to its painful irrelevance.131 However, the inclusion of Soviet law 
in the volumes on formation of contracts was more than that. It was 
a demonstration that meaningful comparison was actually possible 
in law, regardless of the ideological self-image of any legal system. 
Was this really true? Was the rethinking of the opposition between 
common law and civil law itself an ideological Cold War move? Was 
the image of convergence, that powerfully emerged from the Cornell 
seminars, a simple way to claim the superiority of Western law (or at 
least of Western comparative law) in a moment in which Soviet legal 
comparatists were weakened by the dogma of state sovereignty over 
the sources of law, and by their own consequent difficulty in finding 
meaningful comparison?
No matter what the answers to these questions might be, it is 
a fact that as a byproduct of an ideologically inflected preliminary 
discussion on the choice of the legal systems to be discussed and 
the contributors to be invited to Cornell (using Ford Foundation 
and Carnegie Endowment money), Western comparatists were 
forced to think about foundational questions related to the very 
purpose of law in society. Asking deep questions has produced deep 
answers, well beyond the mere issue of the comparability of con-
tract law.
vII. the prIvate laW BIas of comparatIve laW
After decades of work in integrative comparative law, “on the 
shoulders of Schlesinger,”132 we have learned a number of lessons. 
The most important one is that the questions you ask determine 
the answers you get. The awareness of this, which now seems quite 
banal, was (and still is for many) painful to reach. One diehard 
byproduct of the common core methodology, certainly borrowed from 
130. See Rodolfo Sacco, Un metodo di lavoro nuovo: I seminari di Cornell, 2 rIvIsta 
dIrItto cIvIle 172 (1972).
131. Frankenberg, supra note 10.
132. See Vivian Curran, On the Shoulders of Schlesinger: The Trento Project on the 
Common Core of European Private Law, 11 eur. j. prIv. l. 66 (2003).
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the Parsonian sociological approach (itself very much instrumen-
tal to Cold War confrontation),133 was the idea of the possibility of a 
perfectly unbiased, neutral, and fully depoliticized objective analy-
sis, if only one would properly apply the functionalist case method. 
To be sure, Schlesinger never made this claim, and it was read into 
his work by Sacco and a wave of mostly Italian “structuralist” com-
paratists, who attempted to move comparative law from function-
alism into a structuralist phase, with the goal of measuring the 
similarities and differences.134 As we know in retrospect, the idea 
of “measuring” institutional differences was mostly responsible for 
attracting comparative law into the orbit of the dominant U.S. brand 
of law and economics, with the naively unforeseen result of the legal 
origins theory sponsored by the World Bank in the aftermath of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.135 However, even stopping short of reaching 
these extremes, a certain conviction of the possibility to distinguish 
an analytic (positive) comparative law from a normative one remains 
dominant even today in spite of much discussion.136 This is a transla-
tion into comparative law of a positivistic bias of social sciences (and 
of course of economics), despite the claim that legal positivism was 
all but defeated already in the taxonomic phase of our discipline. To 
be sure, the meaning of positivism in the legal tradition and in that 
of the social sciences overlap only partially,137 so that we can say that 
after the taxonomic phase a more advanced positivistic phase of the 
discipline emerged. It is no surprise, or scandal, that Schlesinger 
himself shared with his fellow legal realists the idea of clear sev-
erability of the world of what “is” from the world of what “ought to 
be.” However, he never fell short of introducing bold arguments of 
superiority of certain solutions over certain others, like he did in the 
famous Buffalo Law Review piece on criminal procedure in 1977.138 
Nor it is a surprise that he was a true believer in the possibility of 
separating politics from law and the rule of man from the rule of 
law. He had survived quite fortunately the rise of the Führerprinzip 
(the rule of man) and became so genuinely grateful to the country 
where he had found safe haven as to buy into the rhetoric of the rule 
133. Talcott Parson was the most prominent U.S. sociologist through the 1950s 
and ’60s. His role in making Harvard a CIA-friendly campus is not disputed among 
scholars of the period.
134. See Grande, supra note 28; ugo matteI, comparatIve laW and economIcs 
(1997).
135. Instructive of this contamination is the selection of materials in the recent 
comparatIve laW and economIcs (Giovanni B. Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg eds., 
2015).
136. See Symposium, New Approaches to Comparative Law, utah l. rev. (specIal 
Issue) 259 (1997) (held at the University of Utah Law School in October 1996).
137. Mattei, supra note 90.
138. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for 
Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 Buff. l. rev. 361 (1977).
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ajcl/article-abstract/65/3/567/4563343
by UC Hastings Law Library user
on 23 February 2018
597THE COLD WAR AND COMPARATIVE LAW2017]
of law, a darling of the North American psyche.139 The role of immi-
grant legal scholars in the professional foundation and development 
of comparative law in the United States (including the incorpora-
tion of what is today the American Society of Comparative Law) is 
well-known;140 as is also the role of many of such scholars, particu-
larly the refugees from Soviet Russia, in providing intelligence about 
the enemy as well as materials for the early projects of annexation 
of social science to Cold War needs, such as in the projects Troy and 
Camelot.141 These factors, along with the phantom of the Cold War 
hovering over the years of McCarthyism, and the presence of John 
Hazard at Columbia Law School, where Schlesinger went through 
his second round of legal education, must have brought the young 
Schlesinger to suspend, at least in part, his critical and inquisitive 
spirit when it came to comparing Soviet law (often described as ideo-
logical) with capitalist law (described as scientific). Bringing Soviet 
law within the scope of inquiry into the common core of legal sys-
tem was consequently not so much an inclusive move as it was actu-
ally a way to show a certain underdevelopment (very much expected 
given the subject matter) of communist law, as compared to the 
more advanced Western jurisdictions. True, it made a lot of sense 
in Schlesinger’s agenda to show that even an outlier like socialist 
contract law could illustrate the prevailing similarities rather than 
differences when compared to systems belonging to the capitalist 
legal families. This was a smart move toward the depoliticization of 
the comparative legal discourse. However, the move made sense in 
the historical context only because comparative law was tradition-
ally and severely biased in favor of private law.142 Finding a common 
core in contract law between capitalist systems organized around the 
exchange value and socialist ones organized around the use value, 
was an explicit critique of historical materialism. Nevertheless, it 
was a critique that could work only because the object of observation 
was the form of contract law, not its economic substance.143 The pri-
vate law bias of comparative law (where most of the deeply studied 
structural differences are located) made the inclusion of Soviet law 
139. See rudolf B. schlesInger, memorIes (Ugo Mattei & Andrea Padi eds., 2000).
140. See David S. Clark, American Participation in the Development of the 
International Academy of Comparative Law and Its First Two Hague Congresses, 
54 am. j. comp. L. 1 (2006); David S. Clark, The Modern Development of American 
Comparative Law: 1904–1945, 55 am. j. comp. l. 587 (2007).
141. See, e.g., dIamond, supra note 66.
142. For the emergence of the critique of the “private law bias” of comparative law, 
see Ugo Mattei & Mathias Reimann, New Directions in Comparative Law, 46 am. j. 
comp. L. 597 (1998). See also Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing 
and Resistance, 48 am. j. comp. L. 227 (2000).
143. See John D. Hazard, Socialist Law and the International Encyclopedia, 79 
harv. l. rev. 278 (1965). See also gaBrIele crespI reghIzzI, l’Impresa nel dIrItto sovI-
etIco (1969).
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at Cornell a self-fulfilling prophecy of superiority of the core of capi-
talist law.144
For the purpose of this Article, I do not need to spend more time 
on this matter. One can only note how a Cold War urgency, while pro-
ducing the important methodological step forward of developing a 
sophisticated functionalist approach to our discipline, nevertheless 
reinforced one of the key aspects of Western comparative law: its pri-
vate law bias.
vIII. the roman laW suBstratum of socIalIst laW
The strongly held belief in the “rule of law” as an undisputable 
segregation between the domains of law and politics, together with 
the deeply engrained private law bias of the discipline, are two 
mutually reinforcing characteristics of comparative law connected 
with issues of the Cold War. To be sure, Western comparatists spe-
cializing in Soviet law did not do much to overcome these biases.145 
Indeed, the work of legal Sovietologists, rather than an attempt to 
learn from one another and to broaden the perspective of the dis-
cipline, was closer to a sort of external description of an objectified 
reality, a socialist legal family, whose subjectivity was all but denied. 
Western Sovietologists simply assumed that Western law had little 
to learn from socialist legality.146 Indeed, seen from the perspective 
of Western comparative lawyers, socialist law was little more than 
a reduced domain of application of a civil law substratum in areas 
such as economic planning, that a brutal and corrupt regime would 
politically claim were governed by a genuinely different form of 
law.147 Everything that could not be described as an application of 
this substratum, a sort of irresistible continuity that makes any form 
of revolution impossible in the law, was simply ridiculed as regime 
propaganda.148 Intellectual giants, such as Stucka, who in the 1920s 
were deploying sophisticated Hegelian tools to describe a dialectical 
discontinuity between pre-Soviet and post-Soviet legality, were never 
considered as interlocutors, only described as actors (or victims) on a 
tragic and dramatic historical stage.
144. A similar strategy has been deployed also in different domains in the era 
of legal globalization. See Ugo Mattei & Luca G. Pes, Civil Law and Common Law 
Towards Convergence?, in the oxford handBook of laW and polItIcs (Gregory A. 
Caldeira, R. Daniel Keleman & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2008).
145. See, e.g., hazard, supra note 81. More balanced was probably Berman (supra 
note 96), although the strategy of blaming the political authoritarianism of Stalin 
on law was itself quite biased. Nobody has ever blamed Napoleonic autocracy on the 
French Civil Code.
146. See hazard, supra note 81.
147. See Sacco, supra note 83.
148. This is the dominant gist, for example, of the Review of Socialist Law pub-
lished in the Netherlands, whose name was quickly changed at the end of the Cold 
War with the very same implications that we have already discussed for Zweigert 
and Koetz.
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The self-serving nature of this attitude toward socialist law 
seems quite clear. The geographical scope of socialist law was much 
broader than the discourses on the civil law substratum were will-
ing to admit. Socialist law would not coincide with the boundaries of 
the legal family that Western comparatists had built for their own 
taxonomic purposes and needs to make the discipline “scientific.” 
However, the Urals were not a barrier against the influence of the 
Soviet model.149 Only beyond them did socialist law encounter legal 
substrata that had nothing, or very little, to do with the civil law tra-
dition. The Soviet Union was much broader than its European com-
ponent. Many republics within it had experienced Islamic law, and 
never had anything to share with the Central and Western European 
legal traditions. Soviet jurist of such republics certainly were not 
nostalgic for a period in which they could be seen as integrated into 
the Western legal tradition, as was arguably the case (and indeed 
explainable because of previous class belonging) of some of their 
Hungarian, Polish, and Rumanian colleagues.150 The extent of social-
ist legal influence was moreover very broad and quite diverse, rang-
ing from Asia, to the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
In retrospect, there would admittedly have been much to learn 
from the way in which socialist legality attempted to deliver eman-
cipation, desegregation, labor, and property reform. Yet there was 
not such an attitude in the circles of Western comparatists. It took 
Quigley, long after the fall of the Berlin Wall, to show the kind of 
comparison that was going on at the geopolitical level. Moving away 
from a tradition of export-comparativism inaugurated in the United 
States at least since the Wilsonian “white man’s burden” rhetoric, 
Quigley was able to show how much Western legal innovation ben-
efited from examples from the other side of the Iron Curtain.151 
However, professional comparatists busy in private law technicali-
ties, missed the broader picture and yet another possibility for some 
relevance.
Ix. the convergence hypothesIs
Comparatists usually explain the “convergence hypothesis” in 
comparative law152 as the product of a more critical look, in the age of 
149. See Hazard, supra note 116.
150. The most prominent socialist scholars invited to teach short introductions 
to socialist law at the Faculté Internationale in Strasbourg were Eastern European 
and not Russians. One should name at least Victor Knapp, from Prague and György 
Peteri, from Budapest. Among those that obtained preeminence in Western com-
parative law, one should mention at least Mirjan Damaska (Yugoslavian) at Yale 
and Leontin Constantinesco a Romanian immigrant to France. An American scholar 
of Eastern German origins, Inga Markovitz, has also reached preeminence in 
U.S. academia.
151. See QuIgley, supra note 4. See also Mary Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold 
War Imperative, 41 stan. l. rev. 61 (1988).
152. See Mattei & Pes, supra note 144.
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“integrative” comparative law, at the established strong oppositions 
between common law and civil law, especially in the domain of the 
sources of law.153 For example, the doctrine of stare decisis, tradition-
ally weaker in the United States, was quite dramatically relaxed also 
in England in the aftermath of the Practice Statement of the House 
of Lords in 1966. Meanwhile, case law became increasingly signifi-
cant in the civil law tradition, especially due to the growing role of 
the European Court of Justice and of the constitutional courts in 
most jurisdictions. The rising number of special statutes in the civil 
law tradition helped to somewhat weaken the central position of the 
civil codes, while in both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
some important pieces of legislation, such the 1925 Law of Property 
Act or the 1952 Uniform Commercial Code, could hardly be seen as 
simple narrow exceptions to the common law.154 These transforma-
tions, very visible in an era that Guido Calabresi has significantly 
dubbed “the age of statutes,”155 have led to the emergence of rather 
similar interpretative techniques that have also contributed to the 
fading of some classic areas of divergence between common law 
and civil law. Deploying a methodology pioneered by Alan Watson, a 
Roman law scholar whose main agenda in comparative law was to 
disentangle law from the social and political reality, comparatists 
have mostly explained this disentanglement by means of legal trans-
plants156 or of a dialogue between the common law and the civil law.
The Cold War hypothesis suggests a different explanation. The 
phantom of the Cold War had produced a political urge in the capi-
talist block to portray the Western legal tradition as the histori-
cally accomplished epiphany of the rule of law, as opposed to the 
rule of man, Hitler’s vile doctrine. The ideological apparatuses of 
the Cold War could deploy this rhetoric, already successful in deter-
mining U.S. legal hegemony in the aftermath of World War II,157 
against the USSR. Especially after Nikita Khrushchev’s denuncia-
tion at the XXth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, it was 
easy to portray the institutional structure of so-called “democratic 
153. See James Gordley, Common Law und Civil Law: Eine Uberholte 
Untersheidung, 2 zeItschrIft für europäIsches prIvatrecht 498 (1993). In a broader 
perspective that introduces the notion of “integrative” comparative law, see 
Schlesinger, supra note 35.
154. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Civil 
Law: A Fundamental Difference or No Difference at All?, in festschrIft für konrad 
zWeIgert: zum 70 geBurtstag 381 (Herbert Bernstein et al. eds., 1981).
155. See guIdo calaBresI, a common laW for the age of statutes (1982).
156. See alan Watson, legal transplants: an approach to comparatIve laW (1974). 
It would be beyond the scope of this Article to show how the vision of “legal trans-
plants” determined by “prestige” can be seen as a neocolonial and orientalist strategy 
itself aimed at depoliticizing the field. See Mattei, supra note 48. See also elIsaBetta 
grande, ImItazIone e dIrItto: IpotesI sulla cIrcolazIone deI modellI (2001). A discussion 
can also be found in schlesInger’s comparatIve laW, supra note 74, at 223.
157. See Mattei, supra note 48; Mattei, supra note 6.
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centralism”158 as a dictatorship. There was a need to construct a 
tidy separation between law and politics, an achievement that 
according to the dominant narrative in comparative law was pos-
sible only within the domain of liberal democracy, shared by the 
more advanced countries of both the civil law and the common law 
families.
Comparatists bought into the rhetoric of the structural superi-
ority of the rule of law (again shared by both common law and civil 
law) and of its political neutrality. “Where men rather than laws gov-
ern, people usually find it more prudent to seek a powerful human 
protector than to stand on legal rights against the State,” writes 
Schlesinger the 1988 edition of his book, just one year before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.159 Hans Baade, ten years later, in the sixth edition 
of the celebrated casebook, developed this most cursory attempt to 
describe the essence of the Western legal tradition, in contrast with 
both the Soviet Union and China. The outcome was a self-serving 
self-portrait displaying some faith in the idea that only Western-
inspired legal institutions could produce an acceptably “democratic” 
social organization. In other words, showing convergence meant 
claiming that on what “really matters” (democracy, human rights, 
and the rule of law) the most advanced countries do agree, and every 
alternative is hopelessly bound to a dark phase of human history.160
It would have been useless to engage in such mirror imaging if 
comparatists could still comfortably stick to the technical compari-
son of professionalized law as they did until the 1950s, when the 
“rule of man” was certainly the reality in most European contexts. 
Rather, it has been the Cold War confrontation to provide the incen-
tives to distillate a fundamental “structural” analogy of all Western 
countries to contrast them with the socialist block. In this way, the 
integrative and the contrastive methodology, short from being his-
torical phases in the unfolding of the comparative legal narrative,161 
are indeed powerful synchronic weapons. Convergence hypothesis 
in comparative law developed precisely for the ideological needs of 
contrasting the capitalist with the socialist block in terms that, 
rather than being only political or economic, could be described as 
“legal,” with the obvious implication of the “illegality” of any alter-
native vision in which politics would be hegemonic over professional 
law.162 The emphasis on analogies of the common core approach 
158. See Richard Dagger, Democratic Centralism, encyclopedIa BrItannIca, http://
www.britannica.com/topic/democratic-centralism.
159. See rudolf B. schlesInger et al., comparatIve laW: cases, text, and materIals 
(5th ed. 1988).
160. Id. (6th ed. 2001).
161. See Schlesinger, supra note 35.
162. See Mattei & Pes, supra note 141. An attempt to restore some equality of 
treatment of convergent professionalized systems with other conceptions of law was 
Mattei, supra note 90.
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provided an intellectual climate favorable to look for convergence or 
dialogue rather than opposition between common law and civil law. 
The Cold War generated a need to compare on favorable grounds 
the West with the rest (where the alternatives to capitalism resisted 
the U.S. hegemony). The result was an overemphasis on convergence 
that Schlesinger himself, in his last published piece, denounced as 
misleading.163
x. the fall of the BerlIn Wall and the erasure of the sovIet 
laW famIly
At the fall of the Berlin Wall, comparatists did not escape the 
chorus of self-congratulatory rhetoric that for a decade all but 
banned critical thinking from Western discourse.164 Hans Baade’s 
pages, mentioned above, on the shift from the plan to the market 
and the complete erasure of socialist law in Koetz’s third edition of 
the Einführung, as well as in Glendon’s casebook,165 are the best evi-
dence of such an attitude.
Interestingly, the few comparatists still in the business of study-
ing former socialist law deployed the depoliticizing tool par excel-
lence, namely the doctrine of legal transplants, moving it a step 
forward in the process of explaining legal change with no consider-
ation whatsoever for the social or political context.166 Before leaving 
the field open to the work of scores of corporate practitioners and 
World Bank advisors,167 Gianmaria Ajani, a competent Italian legal 
Sovietologist, developed the metaphor of import–export of law, while 
studying competition in U.S. and European legal systems, in order 
to supply law to Russia and other former Soviet republics or satel-
lites.168 This metaphor completed the ongoing global trend to turn 
law into a technology, something that could be supplied (exported) 
with no concern whatsoever for the destiny of the import. The for-
mer third family of legal systems was thus reduced to a market-
place of legal institutions where the issue was whether it was to be 
studied from the supply side (competition between exporting coun-
tries) or from the demand side. What used to be a field of genuine 
163. See Schlesinger, supra note 35.
164. Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in the oxford 
handBook of comparatIve laW, supra note 17.
165. The second edition of Mary-Ann Glendon, Michael W. Gordon, and 
Christopher Osakwe’s Comparative Legal Traditions, appeared in 1994 with all but a 
complete erasure of Soviet law. In the third edition published in 2007 with Carrozza 
and Picker, the subtitle Text Material and Cases on Western Law was added.
166. See Watson, supra note 52 and accompanying text.
167. Rose describes this sociological change in Carol Rose, The “New” Law and 
Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 LaW & 
soc’y rev. 93 (1998).
168. See Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia 
and Eastern Europe, 43 am. j. comp. L. 93 (1995).
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research, with a professional group of competent scholars engaged 
in deep study, became a laboratory of quite superficial observation 
on the passage “from Marx to markets.”169 Thus the “second wave” 
of law and development, sponsored by the World Bank rather than 
by the Ford Foundation, inhabited by biased neoliberal economists 
and legal practitioners, has attracted legal Sovietology into its 
orbit. Any kind of critique, be it by scholars in self-estrangement170 
or comparatists interested in understanding a different pattern of 
law, failed to stave off the assault on the “third family” of legal sys-
tems that clearly was no longer needed after the fall of the Wall.171 
Obviously, this dismissal further proves in retrospect the already dis-
cussed Cold War purpose of building it as a family.
Because China had long been expelled from the domain of social-
ist law (as a “far eastern” legal system in the orientalist vision of 
Koetz—but why should Germany be the point from where to judge 
if something is far?),172 no comparatist applied to its study any of the 
previous knowledge on the communist family. Yet, China has main-
tained a Leninist party structure and a political model of democratic 
centralism (rule of political law) competing for legal hegemony with 
traditional conceptions and Western-inspired modernization.173 An 
unbiased legal comparison would therefore engage in a serious study 
of the post-1978 Chinese Communist Party deploying bourgeois 
law to accumulate capital, as it happened in the NEP during the 
1920s.174 Narrow disciplinary political correctness, which has already 
inserted China into a different family, would not consider that this 
kind of work the province of comparative lawyers, since the study of 
parties is the domain of the political scientist and not of the lawyer. 
China however did not escape the sad fate of becoming the object of 
business-oriented study based on the import–export metaphor and 
the assumption that it lacks the rule of law.175 Teemu Ruskola, one 
of the very few legal Sinologists refusing to use self-serving contras-
tive approaches, has vocally denounced this phenomenon as orien-
talism.176 In spite of the “end” of the Cold War, Western comparative 
legal rhetoric still needs an “elsewhere,” some geopolitical competitor, 
against which to contrast its own self-image of being the cradle of 
democracy and the rule of law.
169. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 harv. l. rev. 621 (1998).
170. See David M. Trubeck & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflection on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 
WIs. l. rev. 1062.
171. See Rose, supra note 167, at 122.
172. Id.
173. See Mattei, supra note 90.
174. For some background, see russIa In the era of nep: exploratIons on socIety 
and culture (Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch & Richard Stites eds., 1991).
175. See kroncke, supra note 11.
176. See ruskola, supra note 62.
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xI. the Ideology of the legal orIgIns
If the Cold War climate produced quite a significant improve-
ment in the quality of comparative law, which was at the early tax-
onomic phase, of functionalism, and of the convergence hypothesis, 
little of value came from the post-Cold War (end of history) rhetoric. 
By no means, of course, is this a phenomenon unique to comparative 
law. The mainstream and the end of history have destroyed dialectic. 
Intellectual enclosure and self-censorship have all but delegitimized 
the critique of a mainstream that still celebrates the fall of Soviet 
Russia as a strategic success.
Historical dialectic generates fruits in terms of civilization 
and respect. As Quigley has shown in his masterful work, Soviet 
legal innovation produced genuine “improvement” in many areas 
of Western law: labor law, criminal law, international law, family 
law, welfare law, even desegregation in the United States,177 have 
benefited greatly from the presence of a powerful Soviet alterna-
tive. The very phenomenon of African decolonization would have 
been unthinkable in any other but a bipolar world. More generally, 
the welfare state, whose peak, especially in the United States (L.B. 
Johnson‘s “Great Society”), coincided with the peak of Cold War con-
frontation in Vietnam, cannot be explained outside of it. The above 
discussion has shown how comparative law has, too, benefited from 
the Cold War confrontation.
The end of history has produced a fierce capitalist reaction 
against Cold War-generated legal achievements. There are simply 
no areas of law where this counter-reformist trend did not emerge. 
International law returned to secrecy and unilateralism.178 Labor 
law canceled most of the achievements of the workers’ movement in 
the name of flexibility and global competitive needs.179 In criminal 
law, retribution and the certainty of punishment replaced social rein-
tegration.180 Even in family law, in spite of increased formal equality, 
the substantive spaces for emancipation have dramatically declined.
The end of history allowed for the triumph of a variety of neo-
formalist, economy-driven jurisprudential movements in the United 
States, replacing legal realism as the dominant mode of thought.181  
The conservative Olin Foundation in U.S. law schools became the 
equivalent, fifty years later, of the Rand Corporation, in leveraging 
“scientific,” rational choice games dubbed “law and economics.”
177. Id.
178. glenn greenWald, no place to hIde: edWard snoWden, the nsa, and the u.s. 
surveIllance state (2014).
179. Frances Raday, The Decline of Union Power—Structural Inevitability or 
Policy Choice?, in laBour laW In an era of gloBalIzatIon: transformatIve practIces 
and possIBIlItIes (Janne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare eds., 2002).
180. See Elisabetta Grande, The Rise and Fall of the Rehabilitative Ideal, 2 gloBal 
jurIst topIcs 1535 (2002).
181. See Mattei, supra note 19.
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In comparative law, the end of history also generated a reac-
tionary phenomenon: the economic literature on “legal origins.”182 
The genealogy of this move, which culminated in an unprecedented 
direct involvement of economists in the study of comparative law, is 
quite clear. To begin with, the comparative mainstream, within its 
purely scientific claim, started to argue that “measuring” analogies 
and differences between legal systems was the only legitimate sci-
entific task of our discipline.183 Soon after in the early to mid-1990s, 
some European and U.S. lawyers and economists put together a loose 
organization, the Comparative Law and Economics Forum, on the 
implicit assumption that only economics, the queen of social sciences, 
could provide the intellectual and methodological sophistication nec-
essary to attempt such measurement.184 Meanwhile, professional 
law and economics organizations were established in Latin America, 
Asia, and elsewhere in Europe. Eventually, a well-connected group 
of Harvard economists provided the World Bank (already alerted to 
the existence of comparative law and economics) with materials for 
a project known as “Lex Mundi,”185 which subsumed the world legal 
systems divided by their legal origin, civil law and common law.186 All 
the legal systems of the world could then be compared contrastively 
according to these origins (shared for instance by Italy, the Congo, or 
Mexico). Different legal origins would explain the comparative effi-
ciency of legal systems measured by a simplified method of statisti-
cal regressions based on data such as the number of days necessary 
to obtain a judgment in commercial matters.
World Bank economists eradicated all the Cold War-induced 
methodological sophistication that legal comparatists deployed 
to contrast the Marxist arguments of non-comparability and/or of 
superiority of the Soviet model: no more taxonomic effort (back to 
the old Victorian divide across the Channel); no more sophistication 
in analyzing the sources of law (back to législation comparée); no 
more convergence hypothesis. Legal origins reduced the triumph of 
financial capitalism to the triumph of the common law tradition. It 
182. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 j. econ. lIt. 285 (2008) for a survey of a 
very large body of literature. Cf. Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & 
Finance and Comparative Law, 52 mcgIll l.j. 55 (2007). For a self-reflection within 
the discipline of comparative law, see Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? 
Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional 
Comparative Law, 57 am. j. comp. l. 765 (2009).
183. See Sacco, supra note 45.
184. See matteI, supra note 134.
185. Lex Mundi is self-described as “an exclusive worldwide network of top-tier 
independent law firms that provides for the exchange of professional information 
about the local and global practice and development of law; facilitates and dissemi-
nates communications among its members; and improves our members’ ability to 
serve the needs of their respective clients.” Statement of Purpose, lex mundI, http://
www.lexmundi.com/lexmundi/Statement_of_Purpose.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
186. On Lex Mundi, see schlesInger’s comparatIve laW, supra note 74, at 267.
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transformed the quest to measure analogies and differences among 
legal systems into a mere ranking. In this vision, legal systems, like 
academic institutions, restaurants, or phone companies, can be cho-
sen according to their position in the ranking, where the most power-
ful and rich are invariably on top, thereby objectifying their assumed 
superiority and blaming the inferiority on the inferior just like pov-
erty is blamed on the poor by the institutions that sponsor this kind 
of consumer-based approach.187 Interestingly, while during the Cold 
War, the Bretton Woods institutions respected their explicit mandate 
not to intervene in the members internal political affairs, the already 
discussed progressive depoliticization of law (its transformation into 
an exportable technology) became the Trojan horse for such direct 
intervention dubbed “law reform.” During the Cold War, public insti-
tutions (such as the Department of Defense or UN-affiliated organ-
isms such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)) would not directly finance study (or intelligence) of the law 
in different countries. They considered it a delicate political matter 
connected with issues of state sovereignty that required the deploy-
ment a variety of private (front) organizations, such as the philan-
thropic foundations discussed above.188 Today there is no more such 
restraint, which is good news for scholars willing to participate in 
the construction of dominant rhetoric. The World Bank, the IMF, 
and many other ideological apparatuses of capitalist hegemony, lav-
ishly fund incursions into the legal systems of the target countries. 
As Michel Albert has masterfully argued,189 capitalism is today itself 
divided into two fronts, and the city (financial capitalism) fiercely 
combats production capitalism (the so-called Rhenian model). While 
the former has its origins in common law, the latter corresponds to 
the civil law tradition. Hence, predictably the political and economic 
conditions post-Cold War are ripe for the soft rebirth of the common 
law versus civil law opposition now in the hands of a new sociological 
group.190
conclusIon
The literature on legal origins has been the only product of the 
century-long transformation of comparative law that I have traced 
that has been known and influential outside a very small group of 
scholars professionally engaged in comparative law.191 While the 
187. See Elisabetta Grande, Against The Poor: Homelessness in U.S. Law, 11 
gloBal jurIst 1934 (2011).
188. See supra Part III.
189. See his classic, mIchel alBert, capItalIsme contre capItalIsme (1991).
190. See Michaels, supra note 182.
191. The point is made by Michaels, id. See also Mathias Reimann, The Progress 
and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the 20th Century, 50 am. 
j. comp. L. 671 (2002).
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Cold War has staged a comparative jurisprudence of intellectual 
giants, such as Schlesinger, Zweigert, or David, attempting to con-
trast other intellectual giants, such as Stucka or Pashukanis, its 
end has produced World Bank-sponsored literature on legal origins: 
a literature that deploys with no shame the neocolonial narrative of 
objective Western superiority outside any attempt to dialogue, even 
within the capitalist block. Unfortunately, as much as our discipline 
flourished in Cold War conditions, it has declined in the era of glo-
balization and mainstream. Perhaps these are the consequences of 
our now century-old disciplined incapacity to move beyond the white 
man’s burden. After all, you can indoctrinate students even knowing 
very little about them.
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